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LOTTERIES AND PUBLIC POLICY IN 
AMERICAN LAW 
STEPHEN J. LEACOCK* 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
Public policy2 is a fundamental norm of common-law 
jurisdictions.3 Moreover, on more than one occasion,4 it has been 
analogized to an “unruly horse.”5 Actually, in 2007, the Supreme 
Court of Utah struck a note of caution and categorized its nature 
as a protean one.6 This categorization was presumably motivated 
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 1.  “Many have held and hold the opinion that events are controlled by 
fortune. . . .” NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 130 (George Bull, trans., 
Penguin Books 1961) [hereinafter MACHIAVELLI]. 
 2.  See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1963) (“[W]hat is commonly spoken of as public 
policy [is] the good of the collective body.”). See also Robert F. Brachtenbach, 
Public Policy in Judicial Decisions, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985/86) 
[hereinafter Brachtenbach] (“[Public policy is] shrouded in the fog of English 
antiquity . . . .”). For a somewhat contrary viewpoint, see W.S.M. Knight, 
Public Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. REV. 207, 207 (1922) (contending that 
the term “public policy” is a more recent development in English law).  
 3.  See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 1 (proclaiming the importance of 
public policy in dispute resolutions).  
 4.  See Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653, 
672-73 (Tex. 2008) (“According to the well-known dictum of an English judge, 
public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you 
never know where it will carry you.”). 
 5.  Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 257 P.3d 1049, 1053 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2011), cert. granted, 263 P.3d 390 (Utah 2011).  
 6.  See Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 175 P.3d 560, 563 (Utah 2007) 
(emphasis added) (“To pluck a principle of public policy from the text of a 
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by the observed reality that the contours of public policy are 
subject to effortless change7 at the will of the judiciary.8 That 
categorization undeniably perceives the fundamental nature of 
public policy as an amorphous one.9 Undoubtedly, with respect to 
the contours of public policy in the laws of the fifty states, each of 
these individual states in the Federal Union would probably prefer 
to be the master of its own house. Such sentiments have their 
supporters.10 Moreover, identifying and interpreting public policy 
may be quite a perilous task.11 
Turning to lotteries,12 the prevalence and significance of 
public participation in playing lotteries in modern American life 
led to Congress’s creation13 of the National Gambling Impact 
 
statute and to ground a decision of this court on that principle is to invite 
judicial mischief. Like its cousin legislative history, public policy is a protean 
substance. . . .”).  
 7.  In Greek mythology, Proteus was a sea god whereas Neptune was the 
Roman god of the sea. See, e.g., EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 38 (New 
American Library 1969) [hereinafter HAMILTON: MYTHOLOGY] (“Proteus . . . 
had the power . . . of changing his shape at will.”). 
 8.  See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that rather than simply 
beginning and ending a decision without further explanation, courts should 
instead set forth a detailed description of the public policy underlying their 
decisions). 
 9.  See Penunuri, 257 P.3d at 1053 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) 
(cautioning that “unless [public policy is] deducible . . . from constitutional or 
statutory provisions, [it] should be accepted as a basis for judicial 
determinations, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection[,]” given its 
protean nature and the risk that it will be used solely to further a judge’s 
personal preferences). See also Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 17 (asserting 
that the task of defining public policy is an arduous one); RICHARD A. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:2, 1 (4th ed. Thomson Reuters 2011) 
(stating that stare decisis rarely impacts public policy since it changes over 
time). 
 10.  See, e.g., Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in English Common Law, 42 
HARV. L. REV. 76, 102 (1928) (arguing that state legislatures are better able to 
judge the public policy within the state than the Supreme Court would be able 
to). 
 11.  See Penunuri, 257 P.3d at 1053 (contending that public policy can be 
difficult to change and should only be modified with caution). 
 12.  See, e.g., 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 7 (2012) (setting forth the 
elements of a lottery). See also KENNETH N. HANSEN & TRACY A. SKOPEK, THE 
NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN GAMING 169 (U. of Nev. Press 2011) [hereinafter 
HANSEN & SKOPEK] (citation omitted) (“[L]ottery . . . mean[s] any game of 
chance involving the elements of prize, chance, and consideration . . . .”); 
CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES 
IN AMERICA 51 (Harvard University Press 1989) [hereinafter CLOTFELTER & 
COOK: SELLING HOPE] (stating that lotteries are embodied by individuals 
buying a chance to win prizes from random drawings). 
 13.  See Fact Sheet, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/bio-law.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter NGISC: Fact Sheet] (stating that on August 3, 1996, President 
Clinton signed the law that created the commission). 
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Study Commission (NGISC) in 1996.14 In its Lotteries Report,15 
the NGISC referred to the “magical thinking”16 that two 
commentators wrote about in their published work.17 The two 
commentators seemed to have suggested that in lottery 
advertising, lottery advertisers seek to “target” this “magical 
thinking”18 in an effort to stimulate a demand for lotteries.19 
Arguably, this “magical thinking” engenders and also fuels those 
beliefs in the power of fortune’s control over events.20 The alleged 
widely held opinion regarding fortune’s control of events21 seems to 
be confirmed by the vast numbers of persons who play lotteries.22 
More specifically, in the context of the law applicable to 
lotteries, historical experience has shown that a number of 
alternatives may exist in any given state at the time that the 
controversy is to be resolved by the courts. First, both a state’s 
constitution and its statutes may be silent with respect to 
lotteries.23 Second, lotteries may be prohibited by a state’s 
 
 14.  See Index, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N (Aug. 3, 1999), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/index.html [hereinafter “NGISC”] 
(providing information concerning the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission). Congress set the duration of the commission for two years from 
the date of its first meeting, which took place in 1997. National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, §§ 4(b), 10, 110 Stat. 
1482, 1484, 1488 (1996). The act mandated a report by the commission to 
Congress, the President, and the governors two years after the commission 
held its first meeting. Id. § 4(b), 110 Stat. at 1484. This report with the 
Commission’s Final Report Recommendations was made on June 18, 1999. 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report, NAT’L GAMBLING 
IMPACT STUDY COMM’N (June 18, 1999), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinafter NGISC: 
Final Report] (describing the development of study recommendations 
concerning gambling behavior in the United States). 
 15.  See Lotteries, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/research/lotteries.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2012) [hereinafter NGISC: Lotteries] (describing the history and evolution of 
the lottery in the United States). 
 16.  Id. (citation omitted) (“[L]ottery play depends on encouraging people’s 
‘magical thinking’ . . . .”). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  MACHIAVELLI, supra note 1. 
 22.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (explaining that lotteries are the 
only type of gambling that most adults have participated in). See also Charles 
T. Clotfelter et al., State Lotteries at the Turn of the Century: Report to the 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission, DUKE UNIV. 3 (Apr. 23, 1999), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/lotfinal.pdf [hereinafter Clotfelter 
et al.] (“Without doubt, the ‘signature’ lottery product is lotto. . . .”). 
 23.  See, e.g., Stone v. State of Miss., 101 U.S. 814, 818-19 (1879) (noting 
that although there was no related constitutional provision, lotteries were 
prohibited from 1822 to 1867, and any individual who conducted a lottery 
during that period was punished for being a gambler). 
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constitution alone.24 Third, a state’s constitution may be silent but 
the state may have enacted a statute that prohibits lotteries.25 
Finally, both a state’s constitution as well as a statutory 
enactment may prohibit lotteries.26 
Notwithstanding these alternatives, gambling has been 
universally frowned upon throughout the entire United States.27 
This remains the case in the present era.28 Moreover, “[a]s a result 
of its unsavory reputation, restrictions on gambling have been 
adopted by practically every country in the world throughout 
history.”29 Specifically, with regard to lotteries, “for the first six 
decades of [the twentieth] century[,] every [American] state 
prohibited lotteries.”30 As a result of public policy disfavoring 
gambling,31 the common law’s general principle is that the 
judiciary will not enforce lottery agreements.32 Fundamentally, 
when parties are equally at fault, courts will leave them to a 
 
 24.  See id. (noting that a new constitution adopted in 1868 provided that 
“the legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale of lottery-
tickets be allowed, nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to 
be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold.”). See also MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 98 
(repealed 1992) (prohibiting the lottery in Mississippi). 
 25.  See Stone, 101 U.S. at 819 (mentioning that from 1822 until 1867, 
Mississippi had no constitutional provision banning lotteries, rather it only 
had statutory bans). 
 26.  See Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 858-59 (Ala. 1984) (emphasis 
added) (“Under [ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 65,] the State Legislature is specifically 
prohibited from authorizing any type of lottery and is affirmatively required to 
pass laws prohibiting lotteries.”). See also Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 
28 N.E.2d 207, 210-11 (1940) (referring to both the Ohio Constitution and a 
1941 statute that provided that “in substance . . . whoever sells or disposes of a 
ticket or device representing an interest in a lottery, ‘policy’ or scheme of 
chance by whatever style or title denominated or known, shall be punished as 
therein provided.”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Pritchet v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 3 Yeates 458, 1803 WL 757, at 
*4 (Pa. 1803) (emphasis added) (stating “[e]very species of gaming contracts . . . 
are reprobated both by our law and usage.”). See also Joseph Kelly, Caught in 
the Intersection Between Public Policy and Practicality: A Survey of the Legal 
Treatment of Gambling-Related Obligations in the United States, 5 CHAP. L. 
REV. 87, 122 (2002) [hereinafter Kelly] (noting that the anti-gambling 
tradition resulted in every state determining that debts arising from gambling 
are unenforceable). 
 28.  See, e.g., Ramesar v. State, 224 A.D.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (stating “[p]ublic policy continues to 
disfavor gambling; thus, the regulations pertaining thereto are to be strictly 
construed.”). 
 29.  RICHARD MCGOWAN, STATE LOTTERIES AND LEGALIZED GAMBLING: 
PAINLESS REVENUE OR PAINFUL MIRAGE 4 (Praeger 1994) [hereinafter 
MCGOWAN]. 
 30.  CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 235. 
 31.  See Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 510 (1884) (citation omitted) 
(holding that all contracts concerning gambling contravene public policy and 
are thus illegal and void). 
 32.  Id. 
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lottery agreement where it finds them.33 
Nevertheless, widespread public playing of lotteries is a 
tenacious activity.34 This tenacity may be a result of the power of 
“self-delusion to which even the best of men are sometimes 
susceptible.”35 This power could be a factor in the condition of 
problem and pathological gambling.36 The extraordinary financial 
success of lotteries37 may be based upon the exploitation of this 
power of human self-delusion.38 Alternatively, it could conceivably 
be the case that the pain of repetitively losing when playing 
lotteries may have a beneficially cathartic effect.39 Perhaps it 
assists human beings in escaping the tenacious grasp of self-
delusion.40 Of course, there may be other alternative perceptions 
that any one of us could effortlessly formulate. 
The historical continuum of the legality of lotteries has 
imitated a pendulum.41 This pendulum phenomenon of widespread 
public playing of lotteries to the abstention from playing them has 
taken place in synchrony with successive state legalization 
 
 33.  See People v. Rosen, 78 P.2d 727, 728 (Cal. 1938) (citation omitted) 
(explaining “[i]t is the law in [California] that certain games of chance, such as 
lotteries, are illegal; that the winner gains no title to the property at stake nor 
any right to possession thereof; and that the participants have no standing in 
a court of law or equity.”). 
 34.  Indeed, it may not be unlike the power of the American population’s 
almost addictive taste in another context. See generally Scott Schaeffer, The 
Legislative Rise and Populist Fall of the Eighteenth Amendment: Chicago and 
the Failure of Prohibition, 26 J.L. & POL’Y. 385 (2011) (chronicling the rise and 
fall of American Prohibition). 
 35.  State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 232 N.W.2d 120, 131 (Neb. 
1975). 
 36.  See NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14, at ch. 4-2 (calling for both 
public officials and individuals in the private sectors to confront problems and 
pathological gambling). 
 37.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted) (“Lotteries rank first among the various forms of gambling in terms of 
gross revenues: total lottery sales in 1996 totaled $42.9 billion.”). The $42.9 
billion represents a 15-year increase of 950% between 1982, when the gross 
revenue was $4 billion, to 1996. Id. 
 38.  See Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 232 N.W.2d at 131 (suggesting the motivation 
to lie may be rooted in self-delusion). 
 39.  See, e.g., DAVID VISCOTT, EMOTIONAL RESILIENCE 80 (Harmony Book 
1996) (contending that pain is necessary in order to “bring individuals] into 
the present”). The author provides two examples of such pain: (1) when 
individuals say “[p]inch me so I know I’m not dreaming,” and (2) when one 
person slaps another who is hysterical in order to shock the person out of 
hysterics. Id. 
 40.  Id.; Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 232 N.W.2d at 131. 
 41.  See infra Part III, A (noting the rise, fall, and subsequent rise once 
again of lotteries in America). See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, 
supra note 12, at 43 (portraying the paradox of public policy toward lotteries in 
that while they are popular, there has always been an underlying opposition 
to legalizing them).  
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followed by state prohibition of public lotteries.42 The sequence 
may be analogized to pendulum swings from feast43 to famine44 
and back again to feast with a vengeance in the present-day era.45 
The pendulum phenomenon may very well reflect political 
adaptations by legislators to perceived pendulum swings in public 
attitudes to gambling in general and lotteries in particular.46 
However, in the context of applying public policy by the judicial 
branch of government to gambling per se, the conceptual norm in 
American common law has remained quite stable.47 The California 
Court of Appeals thunderously articulated that stable historical 
judicial legal posture is the conceptual norm in American common 
law.48 The court enunciated that conceptual norm as follows: 
California’s “strong, long-standing public policy regarding gambling 
is a broad policy against judicial resolution of civil claims arising out 
of lawful or unlawful gambling contracts or transactions, and in the 
absence of a statutory right to bring such claims, this policy applies 
both to actions for recovery of gambling losses and actions to enforce 
gambling debts.49 
This Article discusses the common-law principles of public 
policy applicable to lotteries in America.50 After the introduction in 
Part I, Part II examines how public policy is created in principle. 
Part III then explores the origins of public policy with respect to 
 
 42.  CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 36-38. 
 43.  See id. at 36 (citation omitted) (“1832 [was] apparently one of the peak 
years for lottery play . . . .”). 
 44.  See id. at 38 (citation omitted) (“By 1894[,] no state permitted the 
operation of lotteries, and thirty-five states had explicit prohibitions in their 
constitutions against them.”). See also DENISE VON HERRMANN, THE BIG 
GAMBLE: THE POLITICS OF LOTTERY AND CASINO EXPANSION 121 (Praeger 
2002) [hereinafter HERRMANN] (explaining that gambling laws are the result 
of both negative and positive public opinions, and they can be impacted by 
local support or the lack thereof, and the power of interest groups).  
 45.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“Currently, 37 states and the 
District of Columbia have operating lotteries.”). By 2011, this number rose to 
40. NAT’L SURVEY OF STATE LAW, STATE LOTTERIES 723 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 
The Gale Group 6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter NAT’L SURVEY OF STATE LAW]. 
 46.  See generally NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (discussing the evolution 
of the desirability of the lottery system). 
 47.  Stanley v. Cal. Lottery Comm’n, No. C041034, 2003 WL 22026611, at 
*19 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). See also Meyer v. 
Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d. 262, 267 (N.D. 2001) (citations omitted) (stating that 
courts will not enforce contracts that violate public policy). State laws provide 
assistance for determining whether a contract is contrary to public policy. Id. 
Three examples of when a contract is unenforceable for contradicting public 
policy are when it is: (1) “inconsistent with fair . . . dealing,” (2) “against sound 
policy”, or (3) “offensive to good morals.” Id.  
 50.  See Clotfelter et al., supra note 22, at 1 (“Until 1964, lotteries were 
illegal in every state in this country.”). 
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lotteries in America and presents the history and development of 
lotteries over a discreet time span of American law. Part IV follows 
the evolution from past to present of public policy applicable to 
lotteries in America. Part V assesses the legal impact on public 
policy of legislative changes in state lottery laws. Part VI reflects 
upon the current and possible future public policy landscape with 
respect to lotteries in America. Part VI also ruminates as to 
whether or not the present era represents any departure or critical 
turning points in American judicial philosophy in the context of 
lotteries. Finally, the Conclusion examines the judiciary’s prowess 
in adapting and applying public policy to lotteries throughout 
American law. 
II. HOW PUBLIC POLICY IS CREATED IN PRINCIPLE 
A. Public Policy Generally 
Public policy is the principle that “no one can lawfully do that 
which tends to be injurious to the public or against the public 
good.”51 Public policy has even been declared to be synonymous 
with “the public good.”52 It has been referred to as the “purpose 
and spirit of the substantive laws of a state. . . .”53 Violations of 
public policy have often been associated with immorality. In fact, 
some early decisions have made this association bluntly and 
sometimes sanctimoniously.54 As explained by one commentator, 
public policy is neither a local nor a new phenomenon.55 
“Public policy consists of the ‘principles and standards 
regarded by the legislature’ as well ‘as by the courts as being of 
fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society.’”56 It 
has been described as a “will-o’-the-wisp of the law [that] varies 
and changes with the interests, habits, needs, sentiments, and 
 
 51.  Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1959). See also 
CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 72 (explaining that public policy is synonymous 
with social welfare or the good of the collective body.) 
 52.  Dille v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 196 S.W.2d 615, 629 (Mo. 1946). 
 53.  Johnston v. Chi. Great W. R. Co., 164 S.W. 260, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1914). 
 54.  State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 35-36 (1873) (evaluating the regulation of 
“bawdy houses” in terms of public policy and immorality). See, e.g., 
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 127 S.W. 118, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (“[I]t is 
universally agreed that the promotion of public and private morals is one of 
the chief purposes of the law . . . .”). See also Muschany v. U.S., 324 U.S. 49, 66 
(1945) (holding that “violations of obvious ethical or moral standards” were 
contrary to public policy); Kitchen v. Greenabaum, 61 Mo. 110, 115 (1875) 
(evaluating enforceability of contracts by considering them in terms of 
morality and public policy).  
 55.  See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 4 (footnote omitted) (recognizing 
that scholars and case law first started acknowledging public policy, as it is 
known today, in the fifteenth century).  
 56.  Bolz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 P.3d 898, 902 (Kan. 2002). 
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fashions of the day. . . .”57 Essentially, public policy is a 
manifestation of the values, norms, and ideals of a society.58 It is 
therefore pervasive in all aspects of the law.59 Oliver Wendell 
Holms described it as “the very essence of law.”60 
Identifying and declaring violations of public policy is a 
delicate, subtle, and difficult intellectual task. This task legally 
implicates calibrating and balancing the intersection of the legal 
spheres of the legislature, judiciary and executive branches in the 
constitutional law separation of powers context.61 It is not all 
dissimilar to identifying and declaring fundamental constitutional 
rights under the United States Constitution.62 
Moreover, the application of public policy principles to 
lotteries is not at all “static.”63 It is subject to “change as the 
relevant factual situation and the thinking of the times change.”64 
Thus, the public policy of one generation will not necessarily be 
retained either in its entirety or even partially as the public policy 
of another.65 The circumstances of human life change. Moreover, 
 
 57.  Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. 1954). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 413 (Belknap Press 1986) 
[hereinafter DWORKIN] (reasoning that the “[law focuses on] the people we 
want to be and the community we aim to have”). 
 60.  Edith Vieth & James P. Lemonds, Whence Public Policy, 52 J. MO. B. 
239, 239 (1996). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466 (1991) (citing 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (Little, Brown & Co. 
1938) (1881)) (stating that principles developed through litigation reflect 
public policy which is shaped by “our practice and traditions, [and is] the 
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions”).  
 61.  See Kathryn R. L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics, 
State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming, 
90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 982-83 (2007) [hereinafter Rand] (mentioning the 
interplay between separation of powers and public policy and the extent of 
gambling permitted within a state). 
 62.  See, e.g., Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (determining that in order to prevent the 
Constitution from reflecting only one set of ethical opinions, “considerable 
latitude must be allowed for difference of view”). Thus, while legislative 
opinions cannot control courts, courts should be careful not to rule a law 
unconstitutional simply because it reflects an ethical position with which they 
disagree. Id.  
 63.  Brown v. Snohomish Cnty. Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334, 338 (Wash. 
1993). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See Funk v. U.S., 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted) (“The public policy of one generation may not, under changed 
conditions, be the public policy of another.”); Hall v. Baylous, 153 S.E. 293, 295 
(W. Va. 1930) (contending that future generations may disagree with the 
current population as to what does and does not violate public policy). See also 
F.A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 254 N.Y. 407, 413 (N.Y. 1930) 
(asserting that public policy changes over time and that it can be identified by 
state constitutions, court decisions, and the laws created by the states 
legislatures). 
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courts have not been oblivious to these modulations in public 
policy. For example, explicitly referencing the physician’s duty of 
confidentiality to his patients, the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
sitting en banc, observed reflectively that “the common law and 
the public policy of this state are not stagnant but are 
evolutionary.”66 
Therefore, the quintessential value of public policy must be 
questioned continually. It must be prospected on an ongoing basis. 
In this sense, it is not at all dissimilar to prospecting for the 
precious metal gold. The precious nuggets must be prospected 
from the surrounding debris. It is an ongoing fundamental judicial 
obligation. Indeed, as the Missouri Court of Appeals has proposed, 
“[c]ourts have a duty to criticize and reexamine the relationship of 
the rule[s] [enunciated in earlier court decisions applicable] to 
public policy and to make modifications.”67 Those modifications, 
which are legally appropriate in the context of lotteries, will be the 
ones selected and implemented by the judiciary. 
As a result, therefore, courts reach discreet conclusions as 
they become legally necessary. In some cases, courts may decline 
to enforce particular components of any contract, rather than 
nullifying it in toto.68 It is essentially a balancing test.69 In other 
cases, where the facts and circumstances are sufficiently decisive 
and the interpretation and application of public policy clear 
enough, the court will forcefully rule.70 If not, the courts may 
 
 66.  Brandt v. Med. Def. Assoc’s., 856 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. 1993). 
 67.  Owens v. Owens, 854 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citation 
omitted). 
 68.  See, e.g., Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 732 (Ala. 2002) (concluding 
that courts can nullify a contract that is unconscionable or contrary to public 
policy), overruled by Patriot Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 929 So. 2d 997, 1006 (Ala. 
2005); Cont’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc. v. Ellenstein Enters., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 134, 
139-41 (Ind. 1996) (same). 
 69.  Cont’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 139-40. 
 70.  See MidMichigan Reg’l Med. Ctr.-Clare v. Prof’l Emps. Div. of Local 79, 
Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 183 F.3d 497, 506 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating 
that public policy may not unambiguously support the permanent separation 
of a medical care professional from further provision of medical care to the 
general public, in spite of some proven acts of negligence); Fomby-Denson v. 
Dept. of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that public policy 
encouraging the detection of possible criminal activity may legally justify 
particular action); Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp. in Haw., Ltd., 58 P.3d 
1196, 1213 (Haw. 2002) (asserting that promises which are offensive to public 
policy will not be enforced by the judiciary); Braye v. Archer-Daniels-Midland 
Co., 676 N.E.2d 1295, 1303 (Ill. 1997) (concluding that indemnity promises in 
construction contracts violate public policy because they do not provide 
incentives for the indemnity to exercise care); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 
1057 (Mass. 2000) (determining that public policy prevented the court from 
enforcing a contract between spouses regarding frozen embryos since to do so 
would result in forced procreation); First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 899 
S.W.2d 520, 521, 523 (Mo. 1995) (determining that the lack of an operator’s 
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simply remand the case for further consideration in light of the 
guidance provided by the court above.71 
Arguably, some bargains may be too offensive to society for 
courts to rule in favor of enforcing them.72 However, enforcement 
of a settlement agreement relating to such violative bargains may 
nevertheless be fully enforceable based upon a state’s affirmative 
public policy favoring settlements.73 It is the judiciary’s function to 
properly conduct such delicate balancing.74 In the overall analysis, 
proof that an agreement is injurious to the public or operates 
against the public good is necessary before a court will eliminate a 
party’s rights to enforcement of such an agreement.75 This is not 
the same as nullifying a party’s right of freedom of contract. The 
right of freedom of contract remains intact. Of course, the court 
will nullify the bargain made when freedom of contract has been 
abused to the point of violating public policy.76 In instances where 
freedom of contract has not been abused, such contracts do not 
violate public policy at all and will be enforced.77 
Of course, the question as to whether or not a contract is 
against public policy may very well be provided for by the state 
constitution or by statute.78 Undoubtedly, when the court 
determines that a contract is inconsistent with fair and honorable 
dealing, it can deny such agreement enforcement.79 Similarly, if 
 
policy of liability insurance in an insurance contract did not violate public 
policy); Clark v. Columbia/HCA Info. Servs., Inc., 25 P.3d 215, 223 (Nev. 2001) 
(claiming that the court may reverse a grant of summary judgment and 
remand the case); Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 965 (N.H. 
1996) (holding that public policy mandates that healthcare maintenance 
organization’s decision to fire a physician must comply with both fair dealing 
and public policy); Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 901, 905 
(N.M. 2003) (concluding that a mandatory binding arbitration clause does not 
offend public policy); Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 267 (refusing to enforce contract 
concerning the division of lottery winnings when gambling and lotteries are 
against North Dakota’s public policy). 
 71.  See generally Owens, 854 S.W.2d at 52 (remanding case for further 
consideration following the court’s consideration of public policy as it 
pertained to the parent-child immunity doctrine). 
 72.  See, e.g., Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 
1001 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that some bargains are less repugnant than others 
and may be enforced while some are more offensive and may not be enforced). 
 73.  Id. at 1001-02. 
 74.  See id. at 1001 (“It is all a matter of degree.”). 
 75.  Clark, 899 S.W.2d at 523. 
 76.  Parker, 624 N.E.2d at 1001. See also Clark, 899 S.W.2d at 521 (holding 
that the court “will not recognize contractual provisions that are contrary to 
the public policy of Missouri as expressed by the legislature”). 
 77.  Johnson v. Peterbilt Fargo, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 162, 163-64 (N.D. 1989). 
 78.  Id. at 163. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-02 (providing that it is 
contrary to public policy to exempt individuals from responsibility for their 
own conduct that constitutes fraud, willful injury to the person or property of 
another, or willful negligent violation of law). 
 79.  See also Meyer, 626 N.W.2d. at 267 (concluding that courts will not 
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the agreement in issue is ruled by the court to be contrary to 
sound policy and offensive to good morals, the court has the 
authority to declare the contract void as against public policy.80 
The principle that the common law has authoritatively 
mandated is that one who has participated in a violation of the law 
will not be granted access to the majestic judicial enforcement 
machinery of the courts.81 Such a person will not be permitted to 
assert in court any right based on or directly connected to the 
illegal transaction.82 In this respect, the United States Supreme 
Court has definitively articulated this fundamental common-law 
principle as follows. The common law has mandated “the 
elementary principle that one who has himself participated in a 
violation of law cannot be permitted to assert in a court of justice 
any right founded upon or growing out of the illegal transaction.”83 
Over two hundred years ago, Lord Mansfield led the way.84 
He enunciated the fundamental doctrine of ex turpi causa.85 
Fundamentally, the doctrine of public policy is “litigant-blind.”86 
This means that, where litigants are equally at fault, the courts 
will leave the litigants as the courts find them. None of them will 
be permitted by the courts to avail themselves of the legal power of 
the courts. They are simply not worthy of such fundamental 
assistance. 
Therefore, when invalidating a contract on grounds of public 
policy, courts must not apply the individual judge’s own subjective 
views of public policy.87 Nor are courts permitted the license to 
grant justices anarchic liberty to promote personal and private 
 
enforce contracts that are contrary to fair and honorable dealing). 
 80.  Peterbilt Fargo, 438 N.W.2d at 164. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-01 
(deeming contracts unlawful if contrary to express law, contrary to policy of 
express law—although not expressly prohibited, or contrary to good morals). 
 81.  See, e.g., Troy Amusement Co., 28 N.E.2d at 215 (citation omitted) 
(prohibiting courts of equity from protecting gambling enterprises and 
nullifying the power of an injunction in such cases). 
 82.  See id. at 216 (citation omitted) (holding that courts of equity cannot 
aid parties involved with gambling enterprises because parties seeking relief 
in those courts must “come with clean hands, . . . and . . . [the party’s] 
demand[s] must not rest on a violation of law . . . .”). 
 83.  Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, 111 U.S. 597, 601 (1884). 
 84.  See Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343 (Eng. 1775), available at 
http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs6/98ER1120.html (proclaiming that courts will 
not assist a plaintiff whose cause of action is premised on immoral or illegal 
acts). The Holman court further specifies that courts refuse to provide 
assistance to such plaintiffs, not as a favor to the defendant, but simply 
because “they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff.” Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  A term coined by Professor Leacock by analogy to the biological 
condition of being colorblind. 
 87.  Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Conner, 973 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th 
Cir. 1992). 
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notions of what is a good value judgment.88 Nor is expediency the 
watchword of judicial behavior.89 Judges are not set free of all 
restraints to indulge in the random conception of ideas of what are 
the viable components of public policy.90 Indeed, public policy is 
not determined by the varying opinions of laypeople, lawyers, or 
judges. Opinion polls are not appropriate as valid instruments for 
judicial identification of the fundamental interests of the public.91 
Furthermore, public policy is not deduced from “general 
considerations of supposed public interests.”92 
Of course, the declaration of public policy has tended to 
display certain evolutionary traits. It has now become largely the 
province of legislators rather than judges because of the modern 
era of legislative activism relating specifically to lotteries.93 The 
underlying momentum for this imperative is not irrational. It is 
appropriate because of the following reality. When compared to 
the judiciary, legislators are supported by facilities for factual 
investigations perceived to be more responsive to the general 
public.94 Courts have openly acknowledged this.95 
Furthermore, although public policy is an amorphous concept, 
arguably it is not fundamentally vague and indefinite.96 In the 
legislative context, therefore, public policy serves as a cumulative 
conception for a number of particularly important factors. These 
are the factors that influence and condition the dynamics of the 
legislative debate. Public policy assists in the formulation and 
validation of the legislative process.97 
Turning to the judicial context, public policy is concededly not 
susceptible to the formulation of an entirely precise rule to be used 
 
 88.  See Penunuri, 257 P.3d at 1053 (discussing the inherent risk that a 
judge will use public policy to further the judge’s own beliefs or preferences). 
 89.  Barton v. Codington Cnty., 2 N.W.2d 337, 343 (S.D. 1942). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Haakinson & Beauty Co. v. Inland Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Neb. 
1984). 
 92.  FDIC v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 998 F.2d 404, 409 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(emphasis added). See also Fomby-Denson, 247 F.3d at 1375 (holding public 
policy is not derived from public interest). 
 93.  In re Rahn’s Estate, 291 S.W. 120, 124 (Mo. 1927). 
 94.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179, cmt. b (1981). 
 95.  In re Rahn’s Estate, 291 S.W. at 124 (asserting that the judiciary’s 
function is simply to determine what is the public policy of a state). The Rahn 
court ruled that it was not against public policy to enforce a will provision, 
written in 1916, directing that money should be used to “assist widows, 
orphans, and invalids” of Germany, which was then at war with the United 
States. Id. See also Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 4 (“[Public policy is] 
shrouded in the fog of English antiquity. . . .”). 
 96.  See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 9 (explaining that public 
policy is an ever-changing concept). 
 97.  See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 1 (emphasis added) (“[O]nly 
constitutional limitations restrain legislative policy declarations.”). 
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in court decisionmaking.98 This makes the effort to attain precise 
identification, particularization, and definition of relevant policy 
considerations a challenging prospect for the courts. The 
judiciary’s attainment of success in this intellectual struggle is 
contextual. In a statutory context, identification of the public 
policy underlying a statutory provision is predicated upon an 
examination by the judiciary of the history, purpose, language, 
and effect of the legislative provision in issue.99 In all other 
contexts, the judiciary honors its constitutional assignment and 
does its best to stay astride the unruly horse of public policy.100 
B. Lottery Legalization 
1. Constitutional and Statutory Position 
Of course, in America, there is no fundamental101 or 
constitutional right to gamble.102 Therefore, the state law of any 
individual state in the United States may rightfully suppress 
gambling. This fundamental legal right for the state law of each 
U.S. state to ban gambling is inherent in the police powers of each 
state.103 The suppression of gambling, therefore, does not interfere 
with any of the inherently fundamental rights of citizenship that 
the government is obligated to protect and secure.104 This legal 
starting point places the legal capability to prohibit or restrict 
gambling105 firmly within the scope of the state’s inherent police 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See, e.g., State v. Brown, No. 37640, 2011 WL 3585530, at *1 (Idaho Ct. 
App. Aug. 16, 2011) (citation omitted) (stating that when a court engages in 
statutory interpretation, it must consider legislative intent, along with the 
public policy underlying the statute, the legislative history, and the words of 
the statute). 
 100.  See Fairfields Ins. Co., 246 S.W.2d at 672-73 (discussing the need for 
judicial restraint when it comes to public policy considerations because it is an 
“unruly horse”). 
 101.  S.C. Dept. of Revenue & Taxation v. Rosemary Coin Mach., Inc., 500 
S.E.2d 176, 242 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d, 528 S.E.2d 416 (S.C. 2000). 
 102.  See Baseball, Inc. v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue, 672 N.E.2d 1368, 
1371 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that no constitutional right to gamble 
exists); Commonwealth of Ky. v. Louisville Atlantis Cmty./Adapt, Inc., 971 
S.W.2d 810, 816 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that the Kentucky Constitution 
does not grant a right to engage in gambling for charitable causes); Durham 
Highway Fire Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Baker, 347 S.E.2d 86, 87 (N.C. 1987) (holding 
no one has a constitutional right to operate a gambling business). 
 103.  See, e.g., Stone, 101 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) 
(determining that rather than giving a general and abstract definition of the 
police power, each case should be decided on a case-by-case basis). It is clear, 
however, that the states’ police power includes anything “affecting the public 
health or the public morals.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 104.  Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1905). 
 105.  See Fendrich v. Van de Kamp, 227 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986) (determining that the state’s police powers permit the state to regulate 
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power.106 
As a result, where a state constitutional provision specifically 
prohibits lotteries, the particular state’s legislature cannot legalize 
any gambling device that in legal effect amounts to a lottery.107 
However, the state’s legislature would probably have the power to 
regulate or to prohibit any and all other forms of gambling not 
prohibited by the state constitution.108 This would flow from the 
fact that the state constitution was silent on these specifics. 
Of course, some state constitutional provisions not only forbid 
lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets, but also any legislative 
authorization of lotteries.109 If, however, a prohibition against the 
creation of a state-run lottery is statutory, rather than 
constitutional, the legislature has the power to create a lottery at 
any later time by legislative abrogation or amendment.110 In such 
circumstances, the preauthorization legal authority of a 
constitutional amendment is not required.111 
A constitutional exception may permit a legislature to 
authorize lotteries in specific circumstances.112 Such lotteries may 
constitutionally require regulation, control, ownership, and 
 
gambling); People v. Monroe, 182 N.E. 439, 446 (Ill. 1932) (same); Am. Legion 
Post No. 113 v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (same); 
Louisville Atlantis Cmty./Adapt, Inc., 971 S.W.2d at 818; Brown v. State 
Through Dept. of Pub. Safety and Corr., La. Gaming Control Bd., 680 So. 2d 
1179, 1183 (La. 1996) (explaining that states can regulate lotteries); Parkes v. 
Bartlett, 210 N.W. 492, 494 (Mich. 1926) (holding that the state’s police 
powers permit the state to regulate gambling); State ex rel. Spire v. 
Strawberries, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Neb. 1991) (same); State v. Bd. of 
Com’rs of City of Las Vegas, 1 P.2d 570, 572 (Nev. 1931) (same); State v. 
Felton, 80 S.E.2d 625, 629 (N.C. 1954) (same); Rosemary Coin Mach., Inc., 500 
S.E.2d at 180 (prohibiting gambling is a legitimate governmental purpose 
under the police power). 
 106.  See, e.g., Stone, 101 U.S. at 817 (“[T]he legislature cannot bargain away 
the police power of a State.”). 
 107.  See generally Harris v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 869 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1994) 
(holding that the legislature cannot constitutionally permit certain forms of 
legalized gambling because it constituted a lottery in violation of state 
constitution). 
 108.  Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486, 490 (Fla. 1935). 
 109.  See State ex rel. Tyson v. Ted’s Game Enters., 893 So. 2d 355, 370 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2002) (ruling that Article 4, Section 65 of the Alabama Constitution 
prohibits lotteries and any scheme similar to a lottery); State v. Nixon, 384 
N.E.2d 152, 197 (Ind. 1979) (stating that Article 15, Section 8 of the Indiana 
Constitution prohibited the lottery); Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 240 
(S.D. 1994) (discussing a 1986 amendment to Article III, Section 25 of the 
South Dakota Constitution which permitted the legislature to authorize a 
state lottery). 
 110.  State ex rel. Clark v. State Canvassing Bd., 888 P.2d 458, 463 (N.M. 
1995). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  State ex rel. Mountaineer Park, Inc. v. Polan, 438 S.E.2d 308, 318 (W. 
Va. 1993). 
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operation by the state. If so, only those lottery operations that are 
regulated, controlled, owned, and operated in the manner 
mandated by the statutorily enacted specifics can legally be 
conducted.113 Of course, the express provisions of the exception 
would need to be followed because of the doctrine of strict 
construction.114 
An absolute bar imposed by some constitutional provisions 
may very well include not only lotteries, but also any enterprises, 
machinations or gaming conceptions based upon the lottery 
principle.115 However, interpretation of all measures whether 
constitutional or statutory, would rest with the judiciary.116 So, the 
judiciary may construe a constitutional provision as an absolute 
bar only to lotteries. In such instances, the courts analyze each 
type of gambling in issue individually and separately in order to 
determine whether or not it constitutes a lottery.117 Some 
gambling devices may be construed to be lotteries while others 
may be ruled not to be lotteries. If a type of gambling is construed 
as not being a lottery, it may very well survive legal nullification 
by the courts.118 In such instances, the courts may very well 
interpret the constitutional measure as excluding the forms of 
gambling that do not consist of lotteries from the parameters of 
the constitutional prohibition. 
Of course, where lotteries are constitutionally prohibited, and 
penalties are constitutionally imposed, the legislature of the 
particular state cannot legitimately diminish any penalties or 
other punitive measures mandated for the operation of 
constitutionally prohibited lotteries.119 Proof of even the 
fundamental value of financial assistance to charity provided from 
the proceeds derived from the operation of such a lottery cannot 
suffice to override this constitutional prohibition.120 Charitable 
assistance cannot provide the necessary legal salvation to rescue a 
proven lottery.121 Therefore, a lottery will not be saved by the fact 
that it is conducted for charitable, patriotic, or other worthy 
 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Try-Me Bottling Co. v. State, 178 So. 231, 234 (Ala. 1938). 
 116.  See State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 20 (citation omitted) 
(concluding that the judiciary is the proper forum for interpreting the state 
constitution’s use of the term “lottery”). 
 117.  State ex rel. Gabalac v. New Universal Congregation of Living Souls, 
379 N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ohio 1977). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Silberman v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 169 A. 170, 172 (Union Cnty. Ct. 
1933). 
 120.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d 787, 796 
(Wash. 1952) (finding that regardless of the charitable function of an 
organization, if the operation runs contrary to the state constitution, it will be 
deemed illegal). 
 121.  Id. 
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societal objectives or purposes.122 
2. Sources of Influence on Legalization 
Court decisions that implicate public policy result from 
judicial awareness and evaluation of a number of interactive 
factors that would have inevitably impacted the legislative 
process. This decisionmaking may be analogized to the dynamic 
interaction of demand and supply with respect to a good. In any 
given common-law jurisdiction, similar dynamics exist by analogy 
to the demand and supply in the context of legislation. In this 
situation, the adoption of a state lottery is such an example. With 
regard to demand, the starting point would be the opinions that 
individuals possess concerning the adoption of a lottery. The 
fundamental substratum of any given individual’s opinion may 
very well rest upon a number of factors consisting of multiple 
components. These components could be a function of the 
individual’s annual income, education, age, and also her perceived 
impact of the legislation on moral values and issues. 
A common feature of any political decision in the United 
States is that interest groups often play a noticeably significant 
role in the political process.123 Their viewpoints are inextricably 
intertwined with the ultimate positions that elected officials 
espouse. The emotional and psychological intensity of opinions on 
an issue determine the degree of individual and interest group 
involvement.124 Moreover, the importance—economic and 
multidimensional as indicated above—of the factors underlying 
the particular issue motivates that intensity. Interest groups 
materialize and proceed to agitate the community in an attempt to 




 122.  State ex rel. Trampe v. Multerer, 289 N.W. 600, 604 (Wis. 1940). 
 123.  Gregory D. Jones, Comment, Electronic Rulemaking in the New Age of 
Openness: Proposing a Voluntary Two-Tier Registration System for 
Regulations.Gov, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1261, 1266 (2012) (“Interest groups have 
played an important role in American politics since the nation’s founding.”). 
 124.  See Allen Hays, The Role of Interest Groups, DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/Demopaper/dmpaper9.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2012) (explaining that interest groups often represent or 
support issues that have significant public support). 
 125.  Id. 
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3. Lobbying126 
The strategic use of lobbying and making monetary political 
contributions tend to be the mechanisms that interest groups use 
in their attempt to achieve the greatest political impact.127 These 
mechanisms are activated in order to exert the maximum leverage 
upon the point of view of elected political representatives whose 
votes enact the particular legislative measure or measures.128 In 
addition, lobbyists may attempt to increase popular support at 
large as well, rather than limiting their impact to the elected 
representatives of the particular constituency.129 In this way, 
individual opinions combined with interest group agitation 
significantly determine the demand side of the graph that charts 
the supply and demand curves of legislation that delineates the 
contours of public policy. 
4. Influence of Policymakers 
On the supply side axis of the graph, the opinions of 
policymakers may be the most viable starting point of the analysis. 
These policymakers include the legislators, as well as those 
persons in the executive branch who can effectuate legislation. 
Since the majority of these policymakers are elected 
representatives, with exceptions of course, some may consider 
individual reelection as a significant political objective.130 It may 
therefore be infinitely reasonable to anticipate that their positions 
will reflect to some degree the present interests of those who 
elected them. Interest groups routinely rack their brains in order 
to invent and creatively use the most effective ways to influence 
the policymakers’ decisions. Interest groups also strive to 
participate in the drafting of legislation if possible.131 
Another potent factor on the supply side is the nature of the 
institutional structure of government itself. Legislation is not 
simply a proposal followed by a vote. It is not that simple. Rather, 
 
 126.  See U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (stating the First 
Amendment guarantees the right to speak to, publish to, and petition the 
government). See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 
141 (“[A] new element has acted as a catalyst for change: the active lobbying of 
firms involved in the sale of lottery products.”). 
 127.  See Interest Groups, http://faculty.ucc.edu/egh-
damerow/interest_groups1.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2011) (stating that 
lobbyists are usually employed by interest groups). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming the Confirmation Process, 50 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513, 567 (2003) (alleging that some representatives are as 
worried about reelection as they are about constitutional issues). 
 131.  Nick Ragone, Introducing Legislation, NETPLACES, 
http://www.netplaces.com/american-government/making-a-law/introducing-
legislation.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
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it must work its way through the legislative process. As a piece of 
legislation is subjected to the scrutiny of legislative committees, it 
is subject to frequent or, perhaps, routine modification.132 The 
institutional structure of government also tends to affect the 
support for a piece of legislation. When enacting bills, one 
legislator may very well condition his support for one measure 
upon the support from a second legislator for the legislative 
initiative of the first legislator. This may very well be a relatively 
routine political practice. The degree of political control that a 
specific party has and exercises might also affect garnering 
political support for adoption of a lottery. 
5. Other Factors 
The synergistic interaction between the decisions reached 
between the policymakers and voters in the particular state may 
affect the decisions made in other states. For example, the 
profitability of lotteries in one state may affect the decision of 
other states to create and implement their own lotteries.133 This 
geographical proximity combined with economics may play a role 
too. This is because the economic effects of a specific state’s lottery 
may be quite noticeable in nearby states. As a result, citizens and 
decision makers in nearby states may be influenced to take similar 
action. Such states may be influenced to create a lottery of their 
own as a form of financial and economic self-defense.134 This is 
because the neighboring states that have enacted the lottery may 
start siphoning off exigent economic resources.135 It may also be a 
matter of emulation in light of the infrastructure and public 
wealth apparently being accumulated. The adoption and 
implementation of a lottery by one state may function as a 
blueprint for another state to take similar action. It may also 
provide information on the potential consequences of such 
legislation. This perception may influence the positions of 
individuals and policymakers from state to state with regard to 
each state’s decision to enact legislation implementing lotteries in 
the particular state. 
 
 132.  Nick Ragone, Committee Consideration, NETPLACES, 
http://www.netplaces.com/american-government/making-a-law/committee-
consideration.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
 133.  See Roland Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gaming Law, 29 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1996) (stating that western states started 
permitting lotteries after witnessing their profitability in the northeastern 
states). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Ronald L. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical 
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 48 (1992) 
[hereinafter Rychlack]. 
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6. Implementation Method 
Ultimately, the multiple factors mentioned above interact to 
produce a decision. The public policy decision is whether to adopt 
or reject a state lottery. The precise method of approval of lotteries 
has varied across states. Routinely, state constitutions have 
needed to be amended.136 Additionally, many states have used a 
statewide referendum as part of the adoption process.137 A 
referendum taking the form of a popular vote after the issue had 
already been approved by the legislature was used in the initial 
lottery in New Hampshire.138 In New York, a constitutional 
amendment followed by the endorsement of two separately elected 
legislatures, as well as a public ratification, was legally 
necessary.139 The use of the referendum method, of course, left the 
final decision to be made by the electorate itself rather than by the 
electorate’s elected representatives acting in the legislature 
alone.140 
Secondly, instead of a referendum, states such as California, 
adopted lotteries through an initiative process.141 Finally, lottery 
adoption in some states has simply required approval by each 
state’s legislature and governor without a direct citizen vote.142 
C. Where Courts Decline to Apply Public Policy to Nullify Some 
Agreements Allegedly Connected to Lotteries 
The common law is a workable system. It is not ineluctably 
rigid.143 As a result, the creative use of exceptions has been its 
hallmark. Therefore, where the judiciary has concluded that the 
facts before the court merit enforcement, in spite of the presence of 
an illegal element, the degree of contamination by the illegal 
element is assessed by the courts.144 Nonreprobable degrees of 
contamination will not necessarily nullify court intervention in the 
 
 136.  See, e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 154-58 
(detailing the state constitutional amendment campaigns to allow lotteries in 
Florida and Virginia). 
 137.  See id. at 145 (explaining that referenda and initiatives were often 
necessary in order to change state policies and laws regarding lotteries 
because many states had constitutional bans against lotteries).  
 138.  Id. at 143. 
 139.  Id. at 144. 
 140.  See id. at 146 (“Of the nearly thirty referenda on lotteries since 1964, 
only a handful have failed. . . .”). 
 141.  Id. at 151. 
 142.  See, e.g., id. at 5 (“In December 1973[,] the [Illinois] state legislature 
passed a lottery bill, and the governor signed it into law with assurances that 
the lottery would be run honestly.”). 
 143.  Rozell v. Rozell, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (N.Y. 1936) (citation omitted).  
 144.  See generally Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing 
whether illegal contracts can be enforced and whether the facts of case 
warranted the court enforcing the illegal contract). 
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cases presented. The judiciary will provide relief where such relief 
is legally justified. In reality, in the context of each controversy 
before the courts, the judiciary will assess whether or not 
enforcement of an entire agreement, or a portion of it, will advance 
a fundamental public policy objective. Of course, the party seeking 
enforcement of the agreements affected shoulders the burden of 
proving to the court that court intervention is fair, equitable and 
appropriate. 
For example, where the judiciary reasons that its intervention 
meets these criteria, complete or partial enforcement of a claim 
may be granted. Such enforcement represents performance of the 
courts’ ameliorative function in the interests of justice and is 
entirely appropriate. In such circumstances, court intervention in 
the interests of fair and just resolution of the controversy becomes 
imperative. This judicial intervention becomes an integral part of 
the public policy principles of the common law itself. 
There are therefore exceptions to the general principle of 
nonenforcement of illegal contracts. These exceptions are fact 
specific and depend upon proof of meticulously circumscribed 
specifics.145 Under the common law, the holding of a lottery is not 
ordinarily regarded as a penal offense unless either a state 
constitution or state statute criminalizes such activity.146 In some 
jurisdictions, statutes have certainly been enacted that make it a 
criminal offense to promote or conduct a lottery or similar scheme 
other than one operated by the state.147 The Supreme Court of the 
 
 145.  See, e.g., Melton v. United Retail Merchs. of Spokane, 163 P.2d 619, 
627-28 (Wash. 1945) (emphasis added) (“[A] plaintiff may recover a sum of 
money from a defendant who has acknowledged that it belongs to plaintiff 
even if that sum be plaintiff’s share of the profits of some illegal business or 
transaction in which both were engaged and equally culpable.”). The Melton 
court reasoned that it could determine “as a matter of law” a promise to pay 
when a defendant acknowledges that the disputed amount of money belongs to 
the plaintiff. Id. (emphasis added).  
 146.  Lee, 163 So. at 489; Becker v. Wilcox, 116 N.W. 160, 160 (Neb. 1908); 
Parr v. Com., 96 S.E.2d 160, 163-64 (Va. 1957). 
 147.  See, e.g., Forte v. U.S., 83 F.2d 612, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (referencing to 
statute that bars individuals from running, operating, or promoting a lottery); 
Waite v. Press Pub. Ass’n, 155 F. 58, 61 (6th Cir. 1907) (discussing a Michigan 
statute barring individuals from creating and promoting lotteries and gift 
enterprises); State v. Shugart, 35 So. 28, 29 (Ala. 1903) (mentioning statute 
that prohibits individuals from setting up a lottery); Burks v. Harris, 120 S.W. 
979, 980 (Ark. 1909) (determining that pursuant to the state statute, it is 
illegal to run a lottery); Ga. Real Estate Comm’n v. Warren, 262 S.E.2d 570, 
571 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (setting up lotteries in order to give away real estate is 
illegal); L.E. Servs., Inc. v. State Lottery Comm’n of Ind., 646 N.E.2d 334, 340 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (referencing statute that bars individuals from conducting 
lotteries); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 166 S.W. 794, 795 (Ky. Ct. App. 1914) 
(mentioning Kentucky statute that bars lotteries); Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., Inc. v. Chen, Walsh & Tecler, 460 A.2d 44, 45 (Md. 1983) (“No 
lottery grant shall ever hereafter be authorized by the General Assembly, 
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United States has held that laws for the suppression of lotteries 
are in the interest of the morals and welfare of the people of the 
state, and are therefore a legitimate exercise of a state’s police 
powers.148 However, even in the face of the criminalization of 
lotteries, the common law’s recognition of exceptions in deserving 
cases remains legally viable. 
1. Legal Impact of Differing Degrees of Culpability on 
Nullification Predicated upon Violations of Public Policy 
First, an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy where the agreement itself constitutes an illegal lottery.149 
Nevertheless, an assertion of a cause of action may be treated by 
courts as valid even though the facts of the case establish that 
there is some contact with a violation of public policy. The courts 
will assess the degree of legal contamination caused by the contact 
with the public policy violation.150 Essentially, the judiciary 
determines whether there is a fatal degree of contamination. If 
there is, then the courts will not lend their assistance to any of the 
parties and will leave the parties where the courts find them.151 If 
the degree of contamination from any violation of public policy 
falls below lethal levels, then the courts may provide assistance to 
the less culpable party in appropriate circumstances.152 
Youngblood v. Bailey153 is helpful in analyzing the common 
law’s resolution of such intertwining issues. In Youngblood, at the 
outset, the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that in the 
context of a particular transaction, the component involving the 
 
unless it is a lottery to be operated by and for the benefit of the State.”); People 
v. McPhee, 103 N.W. 174, 175 (Mich. 1905) (analyzing the state statute 
prohibiting individuals from setting up a lottery); State v. Lipkin, 84 S.E. 340, 
344-45 (N.C. 1915) (discussing state statute that banned lotteries); Stevens v. 
Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 73 N.E. 1058, 1060 (Ohio 1905) (analyzing statute 
that precludes lotteries, wages, and bets). 
 148.  See Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (“It is the duty and function of the 
legislature to discern and correct evils, and by evils we do not mean some 
definite injury, but obstacles to a greater public welfare.”). See also Town of 
Eros v. Powell, 68 So. 632, 635 (La. 1915) (holding that lotteries fall within the 
ambit of practices that corrupt morals and the state can therefore regulate it 
under its police powers); State v. J.J. Newman Lumber Co., 59 So. 923, 929 
(Miss. 1912) (referencing Mississippi precedent holding that lotteries can be 
regulated pursuant to the state’s police powers); State v. Lipkin, 84 S.E. 340, 
345 (N.C. 1915) (citation omitted) (concluding that a state can, pursuant to its 
police powers, enact laws to suppress lotteries). 
 149.  Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 859 (Ala. 1984). 
 150.  See id. at 860 (analyzing the two underlying agreements—one that 
constituted an illegal contract and one in which fraud was present). 
 151.  Rosen, 78 P.2d at 728. 
 152.  See Youngblood, 459 So. 2d at 860 (refusing to leave parties where the 
court found them when one party committed fraud). 
 153.  Id. at 855. 
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purchase of a ticket with a chance to win a certain luxury car was 
void on grounds of public policy.154 The ticket transaction 
component was “a lottery and directly violate[d] the public policy 
of [the] State.”155 The legal nullification of the lottery component 
took effect between the original parties to such transactions.156 
However, the original purchaser of the ticket had sold the ticket to 
a subsequent purchaser who had fraudulently purported to pay for 
the ticket with a legally defective check.157 
These additional facts raised the issue of exceptions to the 
fundamental principle of nullification of transactions on grounds of 
public policy. In exceptional instances, under the common law, 
“contracts offensive to the public policy of the state may be 
enforced because of the inability of an affected party to plead their 
invalidity.”158 Success by plaintiffs in such cases is predicated upon 
proof by such plaintiffs of two indispensable requirements.159 First, 
plaintiffs are required to prove that they are not equally at fault 
with the defendants.160 Second, plaintiffs must also prove that 
public policy interests are substantively advanced by the court’s 
assistance to the less culpable party or parties to the particular 
transaction.161 
In instances where it is proven to the courts that one party 
has fraudulently induced another to enter into a particular 
transaction, the courts may provide assistance to the fraudulently 
induced party.162 In Youngblood, the original purchaser of a lottery 
ticket had been fraudulently induced to sell the pertinent lottery 
ticket to a fraudulent subsequent purchaser.163 This fraudulent 
inducement by the subsequent purchaser invalidated his own 
purchase of the lottery ticket.164 Additionally, the subsequent 
purchaser’s fraudulent conduct left the title to the luxury car that 
was won by the lottery ticket undisturbed.165 Title to the luxury 
car therefore remained securely vested in the plaintiff as the 
original purchaser of the lottery ticket.166 
The facts and circumstances of the case were appropriate for 
 
 154.  Id. at 859. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 860 (emphasis added) (finding that trial testimony demonstrated 
that the underlying incident constituted the fourth time that the defendant 
had perpetuated the scheme in order to defraud individuals out of their lottery 
tickets). 
 158.  Id. at 859. 
 159.  Id. at 860. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
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judicial relief to be granted to plaintiff as the original purchaser of 
the lottery ticket.167 Therefore, the common law afforded relief to 
the original purchaser of the lottery ticket against the fraudulent 
subsequent purchaser, and also against any party whose claim 
was dependent upon such subsequent purchaser’s legal 
iniquities.168 The court applied these principles because the 
subsequent purchaser had made fraudulent representations to the 
original purchaser of the lottery ticket.169 The subsequent 
purchaser’s fraudulent representations consisted of assertions to 
the original purchaser that he had sufficient funds to meet the 
amount of the check that he tendered to the plaintiff as payment 
for the purchase of the lottery ticket.170 
In his defense, the subsequent purchaser claimed that under 
the terms of his subsequent purchase contract with the original 
purchaser of the lottery ticket, valid legal title to the lottery ticket 
was transferred to him alone.171 The subsequent purchaser made 
this claim because he argued that the illegality of the original 
purchaser’s acquisition of the lottery ticket from its original seller 
nullified any right that the original purchaser may have had to 
reclaim title to the lottery ticket from him.172 The subsequent 
purchaser therefore asserted that his valid title to the lottery 
ticket conferred on him alone the entire valid legal title to the 
luxury car.173 
The court ruled, however, that the common law disabled the 
fraudulent subsequent purchaser of the lottery ticket from 
pleading, as a defense, any underlying illegality of the original 
purchaser’s title to the lottery contract.174 The subsequent 
purchaser’s fraudulent conduct nullified any prospect of a defense 
predicated upon any legal challenge by him to the original 
purchaser’s title to the lottery ticket.175 This was the case because 
the subsequent purchaser’s purported defense was nullified by the 
fraud that he perpetrated on the original purchaser.176 
The subsequent purchaser’s fraudulent conduct when 
purporting to buy the lottery ticket from the original purchaser did 
not place the original purchaser’s title to the lottery ticket in issue 
at all.177 On the contrary, the courts did not permit the subsequent 
purchaser to legally challenge the original purchaser’s title to the 
 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
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lottery ticket or to the car.178 Such a challenge by the subsequent 
purchaser was simply a bridge too far because the suit against him 
brought by the original purchaser of the lottery ticket was 
predicated upon the subsequent purchaser’s own fraudulent 
misrepresentations.179 The original purchaser’s suit against the 
subsequent purchaser was also predicated upon the subsequent 
purchaser’s meretricious conduct consisting of his failure to pay 
the check that he tendered to the original purchaser of the lottery 
ticket.180 
 
2. “Hole-in-One” Agreements Between Golfers and Golf Course 
Owners or Operators 
Not all tournaments are illegal lotteries. Therefore, a 
distinction needs to be drawn between similar but legally 
divergent settings. Undoubtedly, an agreement is unenforceable 
on grounds of public policy where the agreement itself constitutes 
an illegal lottery. An example of such an unenforceable agreement 
exists where a promisee has paid a specific sum of money to a 
promisor and has agreed that, contingent upon the happening of a 
certain specified event governed by chance, a prize will be paid to 
the promisee by the promisor.181 However, in circumstances where 
chance is not the dominant factor in the happening of the 
contingent event, an enforceable contractual right can arise in the 
context of a tournament, in spite of the presence of consideration 
paid by a promissee to a promisor, combined with the promisor’s 
promise of the award of a prize to the promisee.182 
In instances where a promisee’s performance of an act is 
bargained for by a promisor as the agreed exchange for a prize 
promised to be awarded by the promisor, on the occurrence of a 
specified event, some elements of chance may conceivably play a 
role in the happening of the specified event that is the contingency 
which triggers the payment of a prize.183 The presence of an 
element of chance does not per se convert the agreement between 
the parties into an illegal lottery. Chenard v. Marcel Motors184 is 
instructive in this regard. 
 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 397 So. 2d 546, 547 (Ala. 1981) 
(citation omitted) (“[T]here are three elements to a lottery: ‘(1) [a] prize, (2) 
awarded by chance, (3) for a consideration.’”). 
 182.  See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (“The test of the character of a game is not 
whether it contains an element of chance or an element of skill, but which is 
the dominating element.”). 
 183.  Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596, 601 (Me. 1978). 
 184.  Id. 
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In Chenard, a party in the State of Maine sponsored a golf 
tournament at a golf club and invited an automobile dealership to 
donate an automobile as a prize at the golf tournament.185 In 
response, the automobile dealership donated a new automobile in 
order to promote its business.186 Advertisements disseminated the 
applicable terms for winning the automobile, which the automobile 
dealership imposed upon golfers participating in the 
tournament.187 These terms required any golfer in the tournament 
to make a hole in one drive on a specified hole at the golf course.188 
These terms were posted at the golf club and were also sent to 
potential participants in the tournament.189 On the day of the 
tournament, the automobile dealership arranged for a new vehicle 
to be driven to the golf club and parked near the golf clubhouse.190 
One of the automobile dealership’s advertisements was placed on 
the new vehicle itself.191 
The plaintiff paid the required fee and registered for the 
tournament.192 At the specified hole, plaintiff shot a hole in one in 
the presence of his three playing partners.193 Plaintiff then notified 
the automobile dealership and claimed the new car as his prize.194 
When the automobile dealership refused to deliver the new car as 
his prize, plaintiff successfully sued the automobile dealership.195 
The dealership then appealed the Superior Court’s refusal to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint based upon Maine’s antigambling 
and antilottery statutes that were in effect at the time of the 
tournament.196 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the judgment 
of the Superior Court based upon the following reasons.197 First, 
the plaintiff’s payment of an entrance fee in order to participate in 
the lawful golf tournament did not, on any legal basis whatsoever, 
convert the legal golf tournament into an illegal wager or 
lottery.198 This was the case because the fees paid by participants 
in the tournament did not make up a “purse” for the purchase of 
the new automobile or for any prize to be won by any of the 
 
 185.  Id. at 598. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 598, 603. 
 196.  Id. at 598. 
 197.  Id. at 600-01. 
 198.  Id. at 600. 
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tournament participants.199 
Secondly, the automobile dealership did not compete for the 
new automobile as a participant in the golf tournament nor on any 
legal basis whatsoever.200 Furthermore, the automobile dealership 
did not derive any profit or any opportunity for profit from the 
golfers’ entrance fees.201 On the contrary, all entrance fees for the 
tournament went to the golf club, which was not in contractual 
privity with the automobile dealership.202 Instead of contractual 
privity, the automobile dealership had provided the new 
automobile to the golf club gratuitously and temporarily, in 
accordance with the terms imposed by the automobile dealer upon 
the participants in the golf tournament.203 Therefore, the new 
automobile was not offered by the automobile dealership as a lure 
designed to sever golfers who participated in the tournament from 
their money for the automobile dealer’s financial gain.204 
Thirdly, the golfers who participated in the tournament paid 
their entrance fees to the golf club as consideration in order to 
participate in the golf tournament, and not for any other reason.205 
These golfers were not risking their tournament fees as a 
mechanism for making a return on their entrance fee money as is 
done in any illegal wagering transaction.206 Furthermore, there 
was no division whatsoever among the golfers in the tournament 
of the cumulative total of the monies from the entrance fees paid 
by the golfers participating in the tournament.207 Neither the 
cumulative total of the monies from the entrance fees paid by the 
golfers—nor any fraction or component of those monies—was 
divided among the golfers as is done in an office “pool.”208 
Fourthly, neither the cumulative total of the monies from the 
entrance fees paid by the golfer participating in the tournament, 
nor any fraction or component of those monies, formed any part of 
the car as a prize.209 On the contrary, the automobile, as a prize, 
was offered by the automobile dealership to the participating 
golfers separately and in complete isolation from the tournament 
entrance fees.210 This offer was for a “unilateral” contract, and was 
made by the automobile dealership to the golfers participating in 
 
 199.  Id. at 600-01. 
 200.  Id. at 601. 
 201.  Id.  
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
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the tournament.211 
The plaintiff accepted this offer when he shot the hole-in-one 
at the designated hole at the golf course during the golf 
tournament.212 When the plaintiff shot the hole-in-one, he 
completed all of the terms bargained for in the offer and thereby 
created a perfectly valid, binding, and enforceable contract with 
the automobile dealership.213 Although it may be argued that 
successfully achieving a hole in one implicates some element of 
chance,214 nevertheless, on the facts of this case, there was no 
violation of Maine’s lottery or gambling laws.215 The automobile 
dealer was therefore obligated to perform its own promise under 
the terms of the contract that was validly created.216 
III. ORIGINS OF PUBLIC POLICY WITH RESPECT TO LOTTERIES IN 
AMERICA 
A. History and Development of Lotteries217 
Gambling is versatile.218 Moreover, in the modern era, 
lotteries are probably the most prevalent form of gambling in the 
United States.219 “Both gambling in general and lotteries in 
particular have long histories in this country and abroad.”220 
Actually, the drawing of lots is conceivably the most ancient form 
of the use of chance to influence particular outcomes.221 
 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 599. 
 215.  Id. at 601 
 216.  Id. Accord Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 359 P.2d at 87 (affirming the 
lower court’s decision requiring the defendant to perform under the contract 
and pay the plaintiff the $5,000 promised to him for getting a hole in one). 
 217.  See, e.g., Lee, 163 So. at 488 (citations omitted) (“Lotteries are of 
ancient origin[,]” and first rose to popularity in the sixteenth century 
throughout Europe, and later the United States, as governments began 
recognizing them as a means of raising revenue). 
 218.  See Kelly, supra note 27, at 90 (emphasis added) (“Gambling can take a 
nearly infinite number of forms, and each State generally has the freedom to 
decide whether to legalize any form of gambling.”).  
 219.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“The lottery industry stands out 
in the gambling industry . . . . It is the most widespread form of gambling in 
the U.S. . . .”). 
 220.  CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 32. See also 
HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 9 (“The earliest widespread legal gambling 
activity in the United States was the lottery.”). 
 221.  CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 33-34. See also 
NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“[M]aking decisions and determining fates by 
the casting of lots has a long record in human history (including several 
instances in the Bible). . . .”). See, e.g., Leviticus 16:8 (King James) (discussing 
the casting of lots to determine fates); Joshua 18:6 (King James) (same); First 
Samuel 14:42 (King James) (same); Proverbs 16:33 (King James) (same); First 
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Furthermore, it has been proposed that games of chance existed in 
antiquity.222 Certainly, the “drawing of lots” probably constitutes 
the most numerous references to “gambling” in the Holy Bible.223 
Of course, the sophisticated technology of modern gambling was in 
all likelihood unavailable in biblical times. Additionally, in the 
historical context, the drawing of lots was probably also a readily 
available uncomplicated form of decisionmaking. 
1. The Rise 
Apparently, in Europe, lotteries may have initially been 
perceived as pleasurable distractions and were therefore included 
in ancient celebrations.224 However, the private commercial 
potential of lotteries must have become self-evident.225 This 
apparently led to the use of lotteries by some merchants in Europe 
to dispose of excess stock or merchandise that remained unsold for 
too long, and also for the disposal of items that proved rather 
difficult to sell.226 
Moreover, governmental perception of the prospective use of 
lotteries undoubtedly materialized as well.227 Governments must 
have become aware of the potential use of lotteries for revenue 
enhancement. This awareness could easily have been created by 
the governmental perception of the comparatively painless impact 
of lotteries when compared to the less attractive governmental 
mechanism of raising its revenue by taxation.228 
Turning more specifically to the North American history of 
 
Chronicles 26:13 (King James) (same).  
 222.  See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 15 (citation omitted) (explaining that 
gambling has been prevalent throughout history as evidenced by its existence 
“among ancient Egyptians, Chinese, Japanese, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans and 
the early Germanic Tribes”).  
 223.  See also NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (mentioning the discussions 
concerning casting lots found in the Bible). 
 224.  See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 20-21 (explaining that lotteries first 
started out simply as party games).  
 225.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“[T]he use . . . [of] lotteries for 
material gain is of more recent origin, although of considerable antiquity.”).  
 226.  See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 21 (explaining that merchants used 
lotteries to help sell excess merchandise). 
 227.  See generally NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“The first recorded 
public lottery in the West was held during the reign of Augustus Caesar for 
municipal repairs in Rome.”). Sources are not unanimous on the date of the 
first lottery. Compare id. (stating that the first lottery was held in 1466), with 
CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 (stating that the 
first lotteries occurred in 1530). 
 228.  See generally NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (explaining that Belgium 
was the home of the first lottery that awarded money and the purpose of 
which was to provide assistance to the poor). But see also CLOTFELTER & 
COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 (endnote omitted) (“The first 
lotteries offering prizes of money was held in Florence in 1530, with proceeds 
going to the state.”).  
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lotteries, one of the first lotteries was held in London in 1612, for 
the benefit of the early Virginia Colony in America.229 Over the life 
of these lotteries, the Virginia Colony’s gain was the British 
public’s loss because the profits redounded to North America and 
not to the British public.230 This inevitably led to the termination 
of these lotteries in due course,231 and domestic American colonial 
lotteries replaced the British ones.232 
Lotteries became popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries in North America.233 Both the government and private 
parties used them.234 Banking institutions and similar financial 
mechanisms were not fully developed in the colonies in this era.235 
It certainly appears that some institutions used lotteries to finance 
building projects for both public and private use.236 Canals, 
 
 229.  See DAVID NIBERT, HITTING THE LOTTERY JACKPOT: STATE 
GOVERNMENTS AND THE TAXING OF DREAMS 19 (Monthly Review Press 2000) 
[hereinafter NIBERT] (“In 1612, James I, the king of England, granted the 
Virginia Company a charter that permitted the establishment of a lottery to 
fund the struggling colony.”). See also MATTHEW SWEENEY, THE LOTTERY 
WARS 15 (Bloomsbury 2009) [hereinafter SWEENEY] (describing the first 
lottery for America); Rychlack, supra note 135, at 24 (discussing the purpose of 
England’s lotteries benefiting Virginia in 1612); NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 
15 (analyzing the lottery’s importance in providing financial assistance to the 
colonies).  
 230.  See NIBERT, supra note 229, at 19 (endnote omitted) (explaining that 
by 1620, lotteries accounted for about half of all financial support for the 
colonies). See also Rychlack, supra note 135, at 24 (explaining that the benefits 
of the British lottery benefited the Colonies, not Britain). 
 231.  See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 24 (examining the termination of 
Virginia Company’s charter). See also MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 6 
(explaining that the Virginia Company was ordered to stop issuing lottery 
tickets since its lottery was much more profitable than the fledgling English 
lottery). 
 232.  See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 24 (commenting that once the British 
lotteries were revoked, the colonies formed domestic lotteries). See also 
CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 (“In colonial 
America lotteries were a popular and common means of financing public 
projects . . . . All of the colonies authorized lotteries at one time or another, 
and a few of them used the device on many occasions.”). 
 233.  See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 6-8 (discussing the history of lotteries 
in America). See also NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (explaining the history 
of lotteries in America); Rychlack, supra note 135, at 25-29 (analyzing early 
American lotteries). 
 234.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 
(discussing the colonial use of lotteries). 
 235.  See Rychlack, supra note 134, at 31 (explaining that America did not 
have a developed banking system in the early nineteenth century). See also 
CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 35 (“Capital markets 
were rudimentary, to say the least, before a national banking system had been 
firmly established.”).  
 236.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 
(discussing early Colonial uses of lottery funds).  
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bridges, and roads were funded through the use of lotteries.237 So, 
too, were construction projects for a number of colleges,238 
including “Harvard, Yale, King’s College (Columbia University), 
Princeton, Rutgers, Dartmouth, Rhode Island College (Brown 
University), the University of Pennsylvania, the University of 
North Carolina and the University of Michigan. . . .”239 
Colonial authorities tended to use lotteries for specific 
building projects as well.240 Of course, some lotteries operated 
outside of government supervision.241 To be sure, some lotteries 
were put to noble or charitable uses.242 First, some colonies, and 
later some states, used lotteries to support military activities 
during the French and Indian Wars of the eighteenth century.243 
Moreover, use of lotteries during the Revolutionary War era also 
occurred.244 It seems that the Continental Congress authorized at 
least one lottery “to support the Continental Army in 1776. . . .”245 
In the early history of the new American nation in the 
nineteenth century, lotteries seemed to be particularly popular.246 
In 1810, Thomas Jefferson initially seemed to be opposed to 
lotteries “however laudable or desirable [their] object[s] may be.”247 
He apparently changed his mind in 1826, however, when he 
encountered financial turbulence and needed funds to alleviate the 
exigent needs of his personal estate.248 He apparently hoped to 
 
 237.  See id. at 34 (analyzing public projects funded by colonial lotteries).  
 238.  Id. See also NIBERT, supra note 229, at 21 (explaining the purpose of 
early American lotteries). 
 239.  Rychlack, supra note 135, at 25.  
 240.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 
(commenting on the fact that “the line between public and private was 
typically indistinct”). 
 241.  Id. (explaining that while some lotteries, the purpose of which was 
private profit, existed, they were never legalized). 
 242.  See id. at 35 (explaining that lotteries were considered to be a 
voluntary tax that raised money for charitable organizations, such as religious 
organizations). 
 243.  See NIBERT, supra note 229, at 22 (“The global struggles for empire 
that embroiled the colonists in the French and Indian War also brought 
considerable hardship and expense, and lotteries were used to subsidize 
colonial war-related activities.”).  
 244.  Id. at 22-23. See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 
12, at 34 (recognizing the important function of lotteries during the 
Revolutionary Wars—raising money to support soldiers). 
 245.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 36 
(discussing Congress’ authorization of a lottery to support the Continental 
Army in 1776). See also MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 10 (pointing to the 
creation of the national lottery to raise funds).  
 246.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 35 (citing 
the popularity of lotteries during the nineteenth century).  
 247.  Id. at 299 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS (New York: Library of 
America 1984)). 
 248.  Id. See also MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 9 (referencing Jefferson’s 
need to initiate a lottery to cover debts).  
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persuade the Virginia legislature to permit him to operate a 
lottery for this purpose.249 In the later years of his career, he may 
have mellowed on the fundamental nature of lotteries.250 Jefferson 
described the lottery mechanism as a “painless tax,” “paid only by 
the willing.”251 
Lotteries multiplied in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century.252 In 1832, the income received from sales of tickets 
constituted three percent of the national income.253 However, the 
reform movement led by President Andrew Jackson intensified 
and sharpened opposition to lottery operations as a whole.254 
Imprecise regulations and relatively lax controls had contributed 
to scandals surrounding a number of lottery operations.255 This all 
led to curbs on lotteries and, in 1833, individual states started 
enacting statutes that prohibited lotteries.256 
The Civil War era and its economic devastation of the 
American South led several states to again consider lotteries for 
statewide financial salvation.257 Some Southern states established 
lotteries as means of raising revenues during the period of 
relatively extensive depressed governmental revenues caused by 
the Civil War.258 Defeat and reconstruction played a major role in 
the difficult financial times experienced in these states.259 The 
Louisiana lottery was probably the largest of them all.260 
 
 249.  MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 9. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id. See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 299 
(attributing the phrase “painless tax” to Thomas Jefferson). 
 252.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 36 
(describing the popularity and increase of lotteries during the 19th century).  
 253.  Id.  
 254.  See id. at 37 (contending that some historians suggest the Jacksonian 
resentment of privilege was a motivating source for opposition of lotteries). 
 255. Id. See also Rychlack, supra note 135, at 32 (contending that lottery 
opposition began to mount due to the change in social reform and the reaction 
to the corruption and abuse that existed within the lottery system). 
 256.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 37-38 
(“First the northeastern states, then the southern and western states 
abolished lotteries until, by 1860, only three states—Delaware, Missouri, and 
Kentucky—still allowed them.”). 
 257. See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14 (describing how the South turned 
to lotteries on account of economic distress exacerbated by the end of the Civil 
War and the North’s unwillingness to lend money or raw materials to aid in 
the reconstruction).  
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. See also Rychlack, supra note 135, at 38-39 (stating that “[t]here 
was a brief revival of state-run lotteries in the 1860s” due to economic 
hardships stemming from the Civil War and Reconstruction).  
 260.  See MCGOWAN supra note 29, at 14 (describing the Lousiana Lottery as 
“[t]he most famous and long-lasting” with “tickets hawked in every major 
city”). See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 55 (“By some estimates . . . the 
Octopus brought in as much as $30 million a year from customers, more than 
90 percent of whom lived in other states.”); CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING 
Do Not Delete 2/9/2013  4:27 PM 
68 The John Marshall Law Review [46:37 
2. The Fall 
In the early 1890’s the federal government began to consider 
legislation to bar lotteries from using the federal mail system.261 
As these efforts opposing lotteries intensified, Louisiana 
lawmakers were persuaded in 1868 to charter a private company 
to run a lottery.262 Of course, the individual states have legal 
power generally to regulate lotteries within the borders of each 
state.263 However, the attempts by states other than Louisiana to 
raise funds from gambling of this type were relatively short lived 
and by the end of the Civil War era, no lotteries legally survived,264 
except the Louisiana Lottery, which survived into the 1890s.265 
Other states had by now ended their own lottery initiatives and 
this development left Louisiana’s lottery in a monopoly position in 
the entire United States.266 
The Louisiana lottery survived because two private brokers 
won a charter from the State of Louisiana.267 These two private 
brokers then hired two retired Confederate generals to oversee the 
lottery drawings and to promote a nationwide campaign to 
popularize drawings.268 The national reach of the Louisiana 
Lottery and the fact that it was held on a weekly basis let it to be 
described as a serpent.269 The mail system was used to purchase 
and sell tickets.270 When the expiration date of the lottery charter 
 
HOPE, supra note 12, at 38 (“[O]ver 90 percent of its revenue [came] from out 
of state.”). 
 261.  MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 15. 
 262.  Rychlak, supra note 135, at 40. 
 263.  See HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 4 (recognizing that policies 
concerning gambling mostly fall within the ambit of the Tenth Amendment’s 
police powers).  
 264.  CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 38.  
 265.  MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14-15; CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING 
HOPE, supra note 12, at 38.  
 266.  See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14 (stating that by the 1880’s, 
Louisiana was the only state with a lottery since the other states had either 
given up on lotteries or had banned them). See also Rychlack, supra note 135, 
at 40-41 (citations omitted) (“Because its books were kept secret . . . it has by 
now been estimated that at its height of popularity, the Louisiana lottery was 
a nationwide monopoly making annual profits of up to $3 million. . . .”). 
 267.  See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14 (explaining that John Morris and 
Charles Howard were the brokers in charge of the Louisiana Lottery). See also 
Rychlack, supra note 135, at 41 (citation omitted) (explaining that while “the 
Louisiana Lottery was run by a New York gambling syndicate[,] . . . [t]o lend 
an air of respectability, two former confederate generals . . . were hired to 
oversee the drawings.”). 
 268.  MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14. 
 269.  Id. See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 54 (“The Louisiana Lottery 
was known as the Octopus because its arms reached into every state and 
city.”); Rychlack, supra note 135, at 40 (citation omitted) (referencing “The 
Serpent,” which was the Louisiana Lottery’s nickname). 
 270.  See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14 (stating that “[m]ore than $3 
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approached, one of the private brokers sought a renewal by 
offering the State of Louisiana a sum of one million dollars a 
year.271 
This apparently brazen entrepreneurial initiative backfired. 
Unfortunately, it seemed that considerable opposition to the 
lottery had developed ubiquitously around the entire United 
States.272 The operators of the lottery were accused of corruption 
and bribery.273 Additionally, the federal government purported to 
enact a number of statutes designed to block the sale of tickets 
outside the State of Louisiana.274 Initially, these provisions proved 
to be ineffective and, actually, quite feeble.275 However, a federal 
statute enacted in 1890 proved to be the coup de grace,276 and use 
of the federal mail system was terminated.277 
In addition, all efforts to win support for a renewal of the 
lottery proved to be unsuccessful.278 The venture had survived for 
some twenty-five years.279 However, in 1894, Louisiana itself had 
finally joined the rest of the country in banning lotteries.280 
Thereupon, the syndicate that operated the lottery moved its 
operations to Honduras281 and resorted to “printing and 
distributing tickets in the United States using private mail 
couriers.”282 In 1895, Congress responded by eliminating this 
loophole in the law.283 This ended the Louisiana Lottery in 1895.284 
“[E]ventually the federal government stepp[ed] into outlaw 
lotteries by the end of the nineteenth century.”285 
 
million was distributed to winners annually” and the national scale 
necessitated the use of the mail system to distribute these winnings). 
 271.  Id. at 15. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  See SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59 (stating that in a vote of “157,422 
to 4,225[,]” Louisiana voters voted against a twenty-five year extension of the 
lottery, and thus “exiled the Octopus”). 
 279.  Id. at 55. 
 280.  See SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59 (explaining that the Louisiana 
Lottery Company’s charter expired in 1894). 
 281.  See id. (“The company pulled stakes for Honduras, renaming itself the 
Honduras National Lottery.”). 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  See NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14, at 2-1 (“The federal 
government outlawed the use of the mail for lotteries in 1890, and in 1895, 
invoked the Commerce Clause to forbid shipments of lottery tickets or 
advertisements across state lines, effectively ending all lotteries in the United 
States.”). See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59 (explaining that in 1895, 
Congress criminalized “the interstate trafficking of lottery materials”). 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 38 (“By 
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North Dakota’s experience is particularly interesting.286 After 
its ouster from Louisiana, the Louisiana lottery company made an 
effort to relocate to the State of North Dakota.287 Unfortunately, 
the corruptive practices used in Louisiana were also used in North 
Dakota, in an effort to relocate the lottery there.288 These practices 
included buying legislators’ votes for $500 per vote to gain support 
for the lottery.289 
When the Pinkerton Detective Agency performed an 
investigation that exposed this corruption, the corrupt practices 
were made public.290 The Senate bill in favor of establishing the 
lottery in North Dakota was indefinitely postponed.291 The 
exposure of corruption motivated the Senate to enact an 
amendment to North Dakota’s Constitution prohibiting 
lotteries.292 The Senate’s revulsion by corruption endures to the 
present.293 The aftermath of that historical upheaval is still 
apparent in the North Dakota Constitution294 and in that state’s 
statutory enactments.295 In the modern era, “[I]n only one state—
North Dakota—has the public consistently voted against a 
lottery.”296 In 1986, an amendment to authorize a lottery was 
proposed, which intended to alleviate the tax burden on the 
citizens of North Dakota.297 However, when put to the general 
public, it met strong resistance and was defeated in the 1986 
 
1894[,] no state permitted the operation of lotteries. . . .”). 
 286.  See Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 272 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting) (explaining 
North Dakota’s unique history of gambling and the working of the state’s 
gambling laws). 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id. at 268. 
 294.  See id. at 266 (“[The North Dakota] state constitution expressly forbids 
lotteries and games of chance ‘unless the entire net proceeds are devoted to 
public-spirited uses statutorily specified as educational, charitable, patriotic, 
fraternal, and religious.’”). 
 295.  See id. at 267-68 (emphasis in original) (remarking that there is a still 
a strong antigambling animus toward lotteries as evidenced by “[N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 12.1-28-02(2)], . . . prohibit[ion on] the sale, purchase, receipt, or 
transfer of a chance to participate in a lottery, whether the lottery is drawn in 
state or out of state, and whether the lottery is lawful in the other state or 
country”).  
 296.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (distinguishing North Dakota as 
the one state where the public has consistently resisted the lottery, despite its 
popularity among the other states). See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING 
HOPE, supra note 12, at 146 (indicating that North Dakota was the only state 
to turn down a state-run lottery and depicting North Dakota’s resistance to 
establishing a lottery by public vote in 1986 and 1988 in Table 8.1). 
 297.  Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 268. 
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general election.298 
In 1993, North Dakota repealed its ban on lottery advertising, 
provided that the advertisements related to a lottery that was 
legal where it was operated.299 The repeal was cited as support for 
the conclusion that “North Dakota’s legalization of advertising of 
out-of-state lotteries cannot be reconciled with the majority’s 
claimed public policy against [lotteries].”300 In reality, however, 
although lawful lotteries remained dormant in the United States 
for almost seventy years,301 illegal operations survived in many 
parts of the country.302 
3. The Rise Again 
Legal lotteries returned with the passage of New Hampshire 
legislation in 1964.303 By the end of 1988, lotteries existed in 
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia.304 “Virtually every 
state has required approval by both the legislature and the public 
in a referendum. . . .”305 Of all the fifty states, North Dakota has 
repeatedly rejected the enactment of lottery legislation.306 
In modern times, state and provincial governments rely on 
lottery revenue for a number of purposes, with supporters 
emphasizing the general public welfare as the most significant 
beneficiary.307 There are, of course, dissenters who tend to 
question the validity of such claims.308 Nevertheless, over the past 
several decades, lotteries have provided quite a steady flow of 
 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. at 273. 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 15 (asserting that lotteries were 
outlawed until “New Hampshire became the first state to operate a lottery in 
almost seventy years” in 1964). 
 302.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 39 
(emphasis added) (“Illegal lotteries existed alongside official lotteries from at 
least the nineteenth century, and, until the reemergence of state lotteries in 
the 1960s and 1970s . . . . In the United States the two dominant illegal games 
have been policy and numbers.”). See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 66 
(describing the “policy wheel,” an illegal game that went underground as 
states banned lotteries). 
 303.  NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15. See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: 
SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 22 (tracing the growth of lotteries to New 
Hampshire in 1964, and explaining that “[b]eginning in New Hampshire in 
1964, the lottery movement spread to New York and other northeastern states 
before jumping to the West and Midwest[, and ] . . . [b]y 1989 lotteries were 
operating in every section of the country”). 
 304.  CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 23. In 2011, 
this number has now risen to 40. See also NAT’L SURVEY OF STATE LAW, supra 
note 45. 
 305.  NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis added).  
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. at 5. 
 308.  Id. 
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revenue into public coffers, and some states have earmarked 
portions of the lottery proceeds for specific educational uses.309 
A more incisive criticism focuses on the conception of “public 
policy being made piecemeal and incrementally, with little or no 
general overview.”310 One question that may be asked in this 
context is: Well, what’s wrong with such an approach?311 One 
answer may be that the NGISC does not seem to be convinced that 
the approach of incremental and piecemeal development with little 
or no general overview is an optimal one.312 The NGISC perceives 
this approach as one which places “pressures on the lottery 
officials” for a number of reasons articulated in its Final Report.313 
In the NGISC’s opinion, these factors have had a critically 
important impact on the public policy of every state that has 
embraced lotteries.314 This viewpoint seems to be shared by two 
lottery commentators of national stature.315 In all fairness, 
however, these two commentators have not concluded that the 
absence of a coherent overall gambling policy or the absence of a 
specific lottery policy are necessarily the most significant factors 
that impact lottery approval.316 
This state of affairs is not an ideal societal equilibrium and 
arguably, it is not equilibrium at all. Instead, it seems to 
constitute an imbalance. Such a state of affairs seems to unevenly 
allocate power to the lottery industry. The balance of power of the 
population as a whole probably requires a more appropriate 
impact of the opinions of elected officials. This would be healthier 
for the public policy of any common-law democratic society overall. 
 
 309.  See id. at 6 (stating that Georgia has attempted to address this concern 
by mandating that “the sole designated recipients are programs for college 
scholarships, pre-kindergarten classes, and technology for classrooms; [and 
that] it is illegal to use the funds for any other purpose”).  
 310.  Id. at 12. 
 311.  One commentator has perceived certain consequences as a result of 
this incremental development. See HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 121 
(observing that gambling policies have developed incrementally, and that once 
made legal, most forms of gambling have been quietly expanded, and 
regulations that could limit revenue growth have been loosened). 
 312.  NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15. 
 313.  Id. (emphasis added) (“Authority . . . is divided between the legislature 
and executive branches and further fragmented within each, with the result 
that the general public welfare is taken into consideration only intermittently, 
if at all.”). 
 314.  Id. (“Few . . . states, have a coherent ‘gambling policy’ or even a ‘lottery 
policy’ . . . [since oftentimes] . . . officials inherit policies and a dependency on 
revenues that they can do little or nothing about.”). 
 315.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 43 
(“[F]amiliarity itself may mollify opposition [to the lottery as evidenced by] the 
apparent rise in approval of lotteries in states following adoption.”). 
 316.  See id. (indicating that other factors for the increase acceptance of 
lotteries is the “general liberalization of attitudes” in society on moral and 
social issues and the “erosion of traditional (i.e. smalltown) American Values”). 
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It would arguably be healthier than an industry-driven policy 
juggernaut that exercises the greatest leverage in reaching tipping 
points relating to significant changes in public policy.317 
A newer development has been the cooperation of a number of 
individual states in America banding together in order to offer 
bigger overall jackpot prizes.318 This development has assisted 
some states with populations that may be too small to support an 
in-state lottery to share in lottery-generated funds along with 
other American states with larger population sizes.319 In fact, the 
first multistate lottery included New Hampshire, Maine, and 
Vermont.320 This turned out to be a precursor to the largest 
modern-day American, multi-state lottery games—Powerball321 
and MegaMillions.322 
B. Federal Lottery Laws 
In earlier U.S. history, gambling policy was considered the 
prerogative of state governments for many reasons. First, the 
fundamental structure of American government under the U.S. 
Constitution consisted of delegated powers.323 Moreover, the 
legislative powers delegated to Congress in Article I, Section 8 of 
the U.S. Constitution, do not expressly include the regulation of 
gambling activity.324 Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution specifically mandates that the “powers not 
delegated to the United States . . . nor prohibited . . . to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”325 
Accordingly, the federal government refrained from regulating 
 
 317.  See, e.g., MALCOM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 247 (Little Brown 
2000) (emphasis added) (explaining that “[t]he theory of Tipping Points 
requires . . . that we reframe the way we think about the world”). 
 318.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“In recent years, the figures for 
the top prize have continued to increase as multi-state consortia have been 
formed with a joint jackpot.”). 
 319.  SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 98. 
 320.  CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 113. 
 321.  See About Us, MULTI-STATE LOTTERY ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.powerball.com/ pb_about.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (providing 
information as to a multi-state lottery operated by Multi-State Lottery 
Association (MUSL) that includes thirty-two states and Washington, D.C.). 
 322.  See History of the Game, MEGAMILLIONS, 
http://www.megamillions.com/about/history.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) 
(providing information as to a multi-state lottery operated by Multi-State 
Lottery Association (MUSL) that includes forty-one states, U.S. Virgin 
Islands, and Washington, D.C.). 
 323.  See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 216 
(2009) (citations omitted) (describing the U.S. government’s powers as being 
limited by the U.S. Constitution, and that “[a]ll powers not granted to it by 
that instrument are reserved to the States or the people”). 
 324.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 325.  Id. at amend. X. 
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gambling for nearly a century.326 
This self-imposed congressional restraint was a function of a 
particular interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In this era, 
Congress did not seem to perceive the Commerce Clause as an 
enabling constitutional source of legal, regulatory power. A small 
number of exceptions existed.327 
Congress was given the constitutional power to “establish 
Post Offices”328 and under the Commerce Clause to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”329 Ultimately, 
Congress’s perception of the potential constitutional regulatory 
power embedded in those expressly enumerated powers changed. 
This change was enervated by concerns raised by potential illegal 
lotteries. The Louisiana Lottery served as a catalyst for the 
unleashing of these activated federal legislative powers.330 As a 
result, the use of the mail system for lottery facilitation was 
targeted in an effort to cripple the interstate activities of the 
Louisiana Lottery.331 
In 1876, President Grant signed into law an act that imposed 
legal sanctions on persons who circulated advertisements for 
lotteries through the mail.332 Then, in 1890, Congress enacted a 
law that proscribed the publication of any advertisements in 
newspapers for lotteries.333 Predictably, the Louisiana Lottery 
managers hunted for any lacuna that they could find in these anti-
lottery statutes. As a result, the Louisiana Lottery managers 
 
 326.  In 1988, acting under The Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3, Congress enacted the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) 
imposing on the several states a federal statutory obligation to negotiate 
compacts in good faith with the Indian Tribes relating to gaming activities. 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(a) (2012). It also 
created a federal cause of action empowering Indian Tribes to compel states by 
action brought in the federal courts to perform those duties. Id. at § 2710(d)(7). 
However, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996), the 
Supreme Court of the United States struck down this grant of jurisdiction to 
sue a state without its consent. The Court also made it abundantly clear that 
these provisions of IGRA could not be validly used to enforce certain statutory 
provisions of IGRA against a state official. See, e.g., Steven Andrew Light et 
al., Spreading the Wealth: Indian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agreements, 
80 N.D. L. REV. 657, 665 (2004) (“In effect, the Court invalidated Congress’s 
carefully crafted compromise between state interests and tribal and federal 
interests.”). 
 327.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 36 (“The 
only exceptions . . . were a lottery to support the Continental Army in 1776 
and a series of lotteries approved by the federal government between 1792 and 
1842 to fund projects in the District of Columbia.”).  
 328.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.  
 329.  Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 330.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 38. 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90 (1876). 
 333.  Act of September 19, 1890, ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465 (1890). 
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moved the lottery operations outside the United States to 
Honduras.334 Congress responded in 1894,335 by enacting 
legislation that prohibited the importation “into the United States 
from any foreign country . . . [of] any lottery ticket or any 
advertisement of any lottery.”336 
Seizure and forfeiture of all such articles was statutorily 
commanded.337 Additionally, penalties of fines with a maximum of 
$5,000 and imprisonment up to ten years, or both, were statutorily 
empowered against violators.338 Then, in 1895, Congress enacted 
an additional statute empowering the suppression of all lottery 
traffic through national and interstate commerce.339 Use of the 
mail was expressly prohibited in this act.340 
These federal laws proved to be very effective as a result of 
the severity of the restrictions imposed upon the operators of the 
Louisiana Lottery.341 Additionally, the citizens of Louisiana had 
become aware of the apparent bribing of state political leaders and 
the extraction of exorbitant profits from operation of the lottery.342 
In contrast, state beneficiaries were being shortchanged.343 
Dishonest games apparently also came to light. Finally, in 1905, 
as a result of statewide pressure from citizens, the Louisiana 
legislature terminated state sponsorship of the lottery.344 
Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions played a significant role in 
this regard. The constitutionality of the congressional enactments 
was sustained. Additionally, the judiciary ruled that the pertinent 
acts of Congress were within the scope of the powers assigned to 
Congress under the provisions of the U.S. Constitution. First, in 
1892, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Ex parte Rapier,345 that 
the 1872 prohibition was a valid exercise of congressional power to 
regulate the use of the mail.346 Then in 1903, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided, in Champion v. Ames,347 that Congress had the 
power to regulate a “species of interstate commerce” that “has 
 
 334.  SWEENEY, supra note 229. 
 335.  Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894). 
 336.  Id. 
 337.  Id. 
 338.  Id. 
 339.  53 Cong. Ch. 191, Mar. 2, 1985, 28 Stat. 963. 
 340.  Id. 
 341.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 38. 
 342.  See NGISC: Final Report, supra, note 14, at 2-1 (stating that bribery of 
state and federal officials occurred during massive Louisiana lottery scandals). 
See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59 (stating that Louisiana’s lottery did 
little to conceal its bribery of public officials). 
 343.  SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59. 
 344.  See id. (“For a number of years the company operated outside the law, 
until raids on these operations finally killed the Octopus in 1907.”). 
 345.  Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892). 
 346.  Id. at 135. 
 347.  Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
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grown into disrepute and has become offensive to the entire people 
of the nation.”348 These decisions were perhaps the straws that 
finally and completely broke the back of the Louisiana lottery. 
Although there were no other legal state-authorized or state-
operated lotteries until New Hampshire began its sweepstakes in 
1964, there were other lotteries that sought markets in the United 
States. In addition to illegal numbers games in all major American 
cities,349 the Irish Sweepstakes, which was created by the Irish 
Parliament in 1930, had significant participants in the United 
States as well.350 At first, the mail was used to promote and sell 
tickets to customers in the United States.351 However, the 1895 
federal law empowered the U.S. Post Office to intervene with legal 
action to combat this use of the mail.352 Ultimately, any residual 
success of the Irish Sweepstakes met with competition when 
American states began to launch their own lotteries. 
C. Criticism of Lotteries as Tax Vehicles 
In every case where states have adopted lotteries, potential 
revenues and the beneficial societal deployment of those revenues 
have been the principal selling points.353 Certainly, Thomas 
Jefferson does not seem to rank among the supporters of lotteries, 
but seems to perceive them as quite an effective taxation-
substitution mechanism.354 The basis for this apparent perception 
is the fact that payments are made voluntarily by those who 
choose to play lotteries.355 
Opponents of lotteries have adopted the language of taxation 
and asserted that lotteries rank poorly according to conventional 
criteria for judging taxes.356 Lotteries have also been compared 
unfavorably to conventional taxes because of their alleged 
instability and limited revenue potential.357 Furthermore, 
 
 348.  Id. at 328. 
 349.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 39 
(describing illegal numbers games in New York and other cities in the 
northeast). 
 350.  Id. at 38. See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 71 (describing the Irish 
Sweepstakes as “one of the most popular” illegal lotteries in the United 
States). 
 351.  SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 71. 
 352.  An Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic Through National and 
Interstate Commerce and the Postal Service Subject to the Jurisdiction and 
Laws of the United States, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (1895). 
 353.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 215 
(“Revenue is the raison d’être of contemporary state lotteries.”). 
 354.  Id. at 299.  
 355.  Id. 
 356.  See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 215 
(stating that lotteries are said to be a relatively inefficient source of revenue 
owing to the high ration of administrative costs per dollar raised). 
 357.  Id. 
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opponents assert that lotteries are regressive, “preying on the 
poor,” whether wittingly by marketing heavily in poor areas, or 
unwittingly by simply offering a product that appeals to poor 
people.358 One Maryland state senator who opposed the lottery 
stated that “[l]otteries place an inordinate burden on the poor to 
finance state government. But the poor are willing suckers, and 
it’s hard to defend a group that doesn’t want to be defended.”359 
Other criticisms of lotteries have been levied.360 One 
commentator has suggested that lotteries are an inefficient way to 
raise money for government.361 Lotteries are also open to the 
charge of being regressive taxes,362 albeit “voluntary” ones, as 
Thomas Jefferson suggested.363 The NGISC reserved many of its 
harshest criticisms for state lotteries. It should be added that 
lottery organizations were apparently not represented in the 
membership of the commission.364 The NGISC strongly protested 
against lottery advertising both for misleading people and for 
encouraging them to participate in irresponsible gambling.365 The 
NGISC also concluded that lotteries did not produce good jobs.366 
Special criticisms were reserved for convenience gambling 
involving lotteries, as the commission recommended that instant 
tickets be banned and that machine gaming outside of casinos, 
such as video lottery terminals at racetracks, be abolished.367 
Some also criticize lotteries as inappropriate enterprises that 
redistribute income by taking money from the poor and making 
millionaires, suggesting that some of these new millionaires are 
unprepared for their wealth and do not use it responsibly.368 
 
 358.  Id. 
 359.  Id. at 215, 299 n.11.2 (quoting Ronald Alsop, State Lottery Craze Is 
Spreading, But Some Fear It Hurts the Poor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1983). 
 360.  See NGISC: LOTTERIES, supra note 15 (emphasis added) (“The focus on 
convincing non-players to utilize the lottery, as well as persuading frequent 
players to play even more, is the source of an additional array of criticisms.”). 
 361.  See SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 133 (explaining that the lottery is the 
most expensive “tax” for states to collect). 
 362. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra 15 (contending that lottery tickets are 
regressive since they are the same price to everyone regardless of each 
individual’s income, and they are “implicit” tax since all revenue received from 
selling them goes to the state). 
 363.  CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 299 n.11. 
 364.  See Members, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N (Aug. 3, 1999), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/members/members.html (providing a list of 
members). 
 365.  NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14, at 3-5. 
 366.  See id. at 3-4 (stating that lottery play is highest in economically 
disadvantaged communities and lottery advertising promotes luck over hard 
work). 
 367.  Id. at 3-18. 
 368.  See Clarence Page, Life Lessons From Sad Lotto Winners, CHI. TRIB., 
Apr. 4, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-04/news/ct-oped-0404-
page-20120404_1_mega-millions-ticket-lotto-missouri-lottery (discussing 
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IV. THE EVOLUTION FROM PAST TO PRESENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 
APPLICABLE TO LOTTERIES IN AMERICA 
A. Lotteries as a Species of Gambling Generally 
In states where lotteries are prohibited, a constitutional or 
statutory definition of what constitutes a lottery may not have 
been provided by either the constitution or the state’s statutes.369 
However, a lottery may be defined as a scheme in which money is 
paid in some form for the chance of receiving money or a prize in 
return.370 The fact that there is sufficient consideration to qualify 
for the formation of a valid contract does not per se prevent a 
bargain from being a wager.371 In essence, it is characteristic of a 
lottery that one party pays a definite sum in return for a promise 
of receiving a greater sum or greater value than that actually paid 
dependent upon a certain contingency.372 Therefore, although 
there may be sufficient consideration, there is no agreed exchange 
of performances.373 Of course, although a lottery displays the 
 
potential problems confronting lottery winners). 
 369.  See, e.g., Troy Amusement Co., 28 N.E.2d at 211 (illustrating the 
shortcomings of antilottery constitutional provisions and laws for being too 
vague in defining what constitutes a lottery, and failing to provide a detailed 
description of what exactly is prohibited).  
 370.  See People v. Hecht, 3 P.2d 399, 401-02 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
1931) (holding that where the winners of a lottery are determined, not by 
chance, but at the will of the promoter, the enterprise is, nevertheless, a 
lottery); People v. Wassmus, 182 N.W. 66, 67 (Mich. 1921) (concluding that the 
elements of a lottery are consideration, chance, and a prize); Knight v. State ex 
rel. Moore, 574 So. 2d 662, 666-68 (Miss. 1990) (refusing to extend the 
definition of “lottery” to bingo even though chance, a prize, and consideration 
were present because it is not popularly thought of as a lottery and, therefore, 
the statute permitting bingo was not unconstitutional); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 
62-63 (holding that a lottery consists of “consideration, chance and prize,” and, 
therefore, games requiring skill, such as blackjack or 21, do not constitute 
lotteries); State v. Emerson, 1 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Mo. 1927) (determining that 
any game or plan in which “anything of value is disposed of by lot or chance); 
CONtact, Inc. v. State¸ 324 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Neb. 1982) (holding that certain 
“pickle cards” constituted lotteries because the element of chance existed since 
the tickets were drawn from a tub, despite the fact that the winning numbers 
were predetermined); Cole v. Hughes¸ 442 S.E.2d 86, 89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) 
(affirming the dismissal of a counterclaim concerning a joint venture to 
purchase lottery tickets because “[t]he parties to the case at hand paid money 
and entered into an agreement, the outcome of which was dependent upon the 
Virginia Lotto, a contingent event, a chance, a lot, however ‘high tech.’”); 
Harris v. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau Cnty., Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 672, 
674-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that a raffle was an illegal lottery, and 
hence the charitable organization could not be compelled to award the prize); 
Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412, 414 (Wyo. 
1977) (determining a raffle to be a lottery, and thus it was illegal and void). 
 371.  Williams, 573 P.2d at 414.  
 372.  State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 867 P.2d 1034, 1051 (Kan. 1994). 
 373.  Chenard, 387 A.2d at 600. 
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characteristics of a wager or bet, not every wager is necessarily a 
lottery.374 
In order for a scheme to be deemed to be a lottery, three 
elements must exist. First, there must be a distribution of gain by 
chance, commonly referred to as a prize.375 Second, the prize must 
be awarded by lot or chance.376 Third, the participants must have 
given consideration for a chance of winning the prize.377 Unless all 
three elements are present, the lottery laws have no application.378 
A lottery, it seems, must depend on a purely fortuitous event.379 
But even if elements of skill and chance both exist in a game, it is 
a lottery if the element of chance predominates.380 Moreover, it is 
not an indispensable requirement that, to constitute a lottery, the 
prize must be in money.381 Essentially, “whenever the scheme of 
distribution is such that—if the payment of the prize were in 
money it would be a lottery[—then], it will be equally so although 
 
 374.  Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 7 So. 338, 338 (Ala. 1890); Wilkinson v. Gill, 
74 N.Y. 63, 67 (N.Y. 1878). 
 375.  State ex rel. Stephan, 867 P.2d at 1040. 
 376.  Id. 
 377.  Id. 
 378.  State ex rel. Stephan v. Parrish, 887 P.2d 127, 137 (Kan. 1994) 
(determining that the Kansas constitutional provision banning lotteries, but 
permitting bingo, did not authorize legislature to define bingo to include 
instant bingo pull-tab game, and such legislation was thus unconstitutional); 
Knight, 574 So. 2d at 666-68 (refusing to classify certain games as lotteries 
simply because chance, prize, and consideration were present when such 
games were not popularly thought of as being lotteries); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 
62-63 (holding that lottery consists of “consideration, chance and prize,” and 
that legislation allowing gambling falling within the ambit of lotteries was 
unconstitutional); CONtact, Inc., 324 N.W.2d at 806-08 (holding that certain 
“pickle cards” constituted lotteries within the meaning of state statute 
permitting certain sponsors to hold lotteries because the element of chance 
was met); McFadden v. Bain, 91 P.2d 292, 294 (Or. 1939) (recognizing that the 
essence of a lottery is a chance for a prize for a price); Commonwealth of Pa. v. 
Irwin, 636 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. 1993) (ruling that video blackjack, poker, and 
other games were not gambling machines per se where they lacked the 
element of reward because the player could not win more money than he or 
she gambled). 
 379.  Stoddart v. Sagar, 2 QB 474, 18 Cox 165, 169-70 (DC 1895). See also 
People v. Reilly, 15 N.W. 520, 521 (Mich. 1883) (explaining that lotteries 
consist of people buying tickets hoping to win a prize solely based on chance); 
Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 64 (holding that games requiring just chance and no 
skill, such as bingo and keno, were lotteries under Missouri law, but games 
requiring skill, such as poker and blackjack, did not constitute lotteries); Cole, 
442 S.E.2d at 89 (stating that any wagers or bets based on chance are 
unlawful); Williams, 572 P.2d at 414 (determining that chance is an essential 
component to the lottery). 
 380.  Commonwealth v. Plissner, 4 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Mass. 1936); Harris, 
869 S.W.2d at 62. 
 381.  See Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch, 80 Wash. 2d 502, 506 (Wash. 1972) 
(en banc) (describing lottery awards as constituting either money or other 
property). 
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the prize[ is] payable in land or in [goods].”382 
A variety of raffles and gift enterprises have been found to be 
obnoxious enough to offend the public policy principles against 
lotteries. For example, a bargain by which a purchaser pays a 
fixed sum in return for a promise to convey a number of lots or 
items—determined by the drawing of lots—has been held legally 
invalid.383 Similarly, a raffle, which permitted the plaintiff to buy a 
chance for a price of $5 to win a forty-acre plot of land was ruled to 
be a void gaming bargain.384 As a result, the plaintiff could not 
recover when the defendant drew plaintiff’s stub and then, upon 
 
 382.  People v. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (N.Y. Mag. Ct. 1939). See also 
Nelson v. Bryant, 220 S.E.2d 647, 648 (S.C. 1975) (holding where the parties 
to the suit agreed independently that if respondent won an automobile at a 
drawing held in conjunction with a fair, they would make a particular 
disposition of it, it was unnecessary to determine whether the drawing 
constituted an illegal lottery since the transaction between the parties was 
separate from the drawing, and did not depend upon any illegality); Williams, 
572 P.2d at 413 (holding that gambling contracts are unenforceable). 
 383.  See Glennville Inv. Co. v. Grace¸ 68 S.E. 301, 302-03 (Ga. 1910) 
(determining that an agreement for lots constituted a lottery because the 
participants paid the same amount of money, and the number and value of 
lots given to them were based solely upon chance); Lynch v. Rosenthal, 42 N.E. 
1103, 1103-06 (Ind. 1896) (holding contract to be invalid where the 
participant’s likelihood of receiving more or less value for his investment was 
premised on chance); Commonwealth of Mass. v. Ward, 183 N.E. 271, 271-72 
(Mass. 1932) (holding that a miniature shovel, purportedly to be used for the 
customer’s amusement, which permits the one paying for the privilege of 
picking up and retaining valuable objects, where the objects seldom are 
obtained, offends a statute against lotteries); Glover v. Malloska¸ 213 N.W. 
107, 107-08 (Mich. 1927) (declaring a contract to be invalid where the 
defendants printed tickets for a monthly drawing for a car and sold them to 
their customers to pass on to their customers and clients, regardless of 
whether they purchased anything); Emerson, 1 S.W.2d at 110-13 (upholding 
prison sentence for lottery contract that called for a payment plan of $1 a week 
until customers reached $55 at which time the furniture would be delivered, 
but at least once a week, the store would draw names and deliver $55 worth of 
furniture without additional payments); Retail Section of Chamber of 
Commerce of Plattsmouth v. Kieck, 257 N.W. 493, 493-95 (Neb. 1934) 
(declaring a plan illegal when it consisted of businesses issuing a coupon with 
each 25-cent purchase and then holding a drawing once a week in which the 
award was a ticket redeemable for a store’s merchandise); Mkt. Plumbing & 
Heating Supply Co. v. Spangenberger, 169 A. 660, 660-61 (N.J. 1934) 
(concerning a scheme in which a store allowed customers to enter into a raffle 
for various prizes after they spent at least $25 in a specified time period); 
People v. Miller, 2 N.E.2d 38, 38-40 (N.Y. 1936) (holding scheme was unlawful 
lottery when customers purchased movie tickets and also received raffle ticket 
for drawing in which money was the prize); Harris, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 673-77 
(holding that raffle was an illegal lottery and thus the sponsor could not be 
compelled to award prize); Allebach v. Godshalk, 9 A. 444, 446 (Pa. 1887) 
(holding sale and purchase of land worthless when it was based upon lottery 
contract). 
 384.  Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412, 413-
15 (Wyo. 1977). 
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receiving late entries, conducted a completely new drawing 
thereby causing the plaintiff to lose his prize.385 
Moreover, the giving of a ticket for the drawing of prizes has 
been held illegal, where the ticket was obtained by the purchase of 
goods,386 the purchase of an admission ticket,387 or on merely 
attending an auction.388 Additionally, slot machines and other 
video or computer games are generally held to offend antilottery 
statutes or constitutional provisions where they do not involve 
skill, but pay winners solely based on luck.389 On the other hand, it 
has been held that the receipt of “Lady Luck” coupons by 
customers after eating their meal was legally different.390 The 
receipt of the “Lady Luck” coupons, entitling the customers to 
draw for prizes, occurred subsequent to the meal.391 Participation 
in the drawing was therefore absolutely free.392 The absence of the 
 
 385.  Id. 
 386.  Holmes v. Saunders, 250 P.2d 269, 269-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); 
Bloodworth v. Gay, 96 S.E.2d 602, 602-03 (Ga. 1957); Glover, 213 N.W. at 107-
08; State v. Powell, 212 N.W. 169, 169-70 (Minn. 1927); Emerson, 1 S.W.2d at 
110-11; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth, 257 N.W. 493, 
493-95 (Neb. 1934); Mrkt. Plumbing & Heating Supply Co., 169 A. at 660-61; 
Miller¸ 2 N.E.2d at 39-40; Featherstone v. Indep. Serv. Station Ass’n of Tex.¸ 
10 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928). 
 387.  Blair v. Lowham, 276 P. 292, 292-94 (Utah 1929); State v. Danz, 250 P. 
37, 37-39 (Wash. 1926). 
 388.  Maughs v. Porter, 161 S.E. 242, 242-46 (Va. 1931). 
 389.  See Loiseau v. State, 22 So. 138, 138-40 (Ala. 1897) (holding that a slot 
machine constitutes a lottery); Lee, 163 So. at 490 (same); Thompson v. 
Ledbetter, 39 S.E.2d 720, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (same); State v. Vill. of 
Garden City, 265 P.2d 328, 332 (Idaho 1953) (same); State v. Barbee, 175 So. 
50, 56-57 (La. 1937) (same); Commonwealth v. McClintock, 154 N.E. 264, 264-
65 (Mass. 1926) (same); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 58-66 (collecting cases declaring 
that slow machines are lotteries, and ruling that record evidence was unclear 
respecting newer video games as to whether they constituted pure games of 
chance, and were thus lotteries, or whether they were games of skill, and 
hence not within the constitutional prohibition against lotteries); MPH Co. v. 
Imagineering, Inc., 792 P.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Mont. 1990) (refusing to uphold 
the contract between the manufacturer and purchaser because electronic 
poker/keno game was a slot machine, and so the contract was void because it 
was for an illegal machine); State v. Marck, 220 P.2d 1017, 1018-19 (Mont. 
1950) (declaring that slot machines were banned because they constituted 
lotteries); Ex Parte Pierotti, 184 P. 209, 209-11 (Nev. 1919) (holding that the 
slot machines fell under the state’s anti-gambling laws); Hendrix v. McKee, 
575 P.2d 134, 137-40 (Or. 1978) (holding that employment agreement was 
unenforceable where employee was hired to make devices that he knew were 
illegal); State v. Coats, 74 P.2d 1120, 1120 (Or. 1938) (determining that both 
pinball machines and slot machines are lotteries); Queen v. State, 246 S.W. 
384, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922) (holding that slot machines constitute 
lotteries); Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d at 796 (determining that slot machines 
only constitute lotteries when they are played for prizes). 
 390.  Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.2d at 797-98. 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  Id. 
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element of consideration prevented the scheme from being a 
lottery.393 
Constitutional prohibitions on lotteries do not universally 
include definitions of what constitutes a lottery.394 Moreover, 
where constitutional or statutory definitions of a lottery are 
enacted, such definitions are not necessarily interpreted in a 
universally identical, similar, or predictable manner. In instances 
where lotteries are defined by a state’s constitution or statutorily, 
common-law principles of statutory interpretation apply to such 
definitions.395 Similar principles of statutory interpretation also 
apply to state statutes that enact constitutionally permissible 
exceptions to the constitutional prohibitions relating to lotteries. 
For example, a state constitution may prohibit lotteries. It 
may not, however, have included a constitutional definition of 
what constitutes a lottery. Additionally, the legislature may not 
have defined lotteries either. In such a situation, the judiciary is 
constitutionally obligated to determine what does and does not 
constitute a lottery.396 
Of course, numerous states have relatively recently legalized 
state-run lotteries,397 and have declared that it is consonant with 
their public policy to obtain funds for such worthwhile purposes, 
such as subsidizing educational programs.398 In such instances, 
 
 393.  Id. 
 394.  See In re Request of the Governor, 12 A.3d 1104, 1111 (Del. 2009) 
(acknowledging that the Delaware Supreme Court fails to define the term 
“lottery”). 
 395.  See Seymour H. Moskowitz, Symposium on Integrating Responses to 
Domestic Violence: Reflecting Realty: Adding Elder Abuse and Neglect to Legal 
Education, 47 LOY. L. REV. 191, 208 (2001) (contending that lottery statutes 
provide a good opportunity for “statutory interpretation and creative 
lawyering). 
 396.  See, e.g., Lichter v. U.S., 334 U.S. 742, 779 (1948) (“[I]t is essential that 
. . . the respective branches of the government keep within the powers 
assigned to each by the Constitution.”). 
 397.  See U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 423 (1993) (explaining that 
Virginia has developed a monopoly on a state lottery); N.Y. State Broad. Ass’n 
v. U.S., 414 F.2d 990-99 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that New York passed a 
constitutional amendment in 1966 authorizing a state lottery); Della Croce v. 
Ports, 550 A.2d 533, 533-35 (N.J. 1988) (although New Jersey has legalized 
lotteries, as well as numerous other forms of gambling, activity falling outside 
the statutes’ scope, such as an agreement to sell an interest in a lottery ticket 
at more than the ticket’s purchase price, remains illegal); Hughes¸ 465 S.E.2d 
at 828-29 (Va. 1996) (explaining that the fact that the state lottery was legal 
did not legalize an arrangement to split the winnings). 
 398.  See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, § 39(b) (directing that any lottery 
revenues be distributed to public education at the primary, secondary, and 
higher levels); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 6-b (directing that lottery proceeds 
should only be used to for education and administrative purposes); OHIO 
CONST. art. XV, § 6 (directing proceeds to be used for education); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 8880.1 (2012) (declaring that proceeds from the lottery would be used 
to supplement educational funding); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4815(b)(2)(c) 
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lotteries falling outside the express parameters of the statutes399 
remain prohibited.400 Moreover, to the extent that a federal public 
policy is expressed in the cases,401 in the statutes banning the 
broadcast of lottery information, and in regulations made 
pursuant to these provisions, it is clear that lotteries are 
prohibited except as authorized by the states.402 Thus, federal 
antilottery statutes sustain and reinforce the public policy of those 
 
(2012) (directing that lottery proceedings be used to fund programs for the 
treatment, education, and assistance of compulsive gamblers and their 
families, among other things); FLA. STAT. §§ 24.102(1), (2)(a) (2012) (directing 
that the net proceeds from the lottery be used to add additional funding for 
public education); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-27-32(d) (2012) (directing that any 
proceeds from the state lottery be used to provide funding for educational 
programs and purposes); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-905(2) (2012) ((directing that 
lottery proceeds are to be distributed to the various school districts in 
proportion to that district’s average daily attendance rate); IOWA CODE 
§§ 99G.39(3)(a), 99G.9A (2012) (providing that lottery proceeds are to be 
distributed to Vision Iowa, to the General Fund, to assist Veterans, and to the 
school infrastructure fund); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-812(2) (2012) (providing that 
lottery proceeds are to be distributed to the “Education Innovation Fund, the 
Nebraska Opportunity Grant Fund, the Nebraska Environmental Trust Fund, 
the Nebraska State Fair Board, and the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance 
Fund”); N.J. REV. STAT. § 5:9-2 (2012) (directing lottery proceeds to be used to 
fund state institutions and education); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1601 (Consol. 2012) 
(directing for lottery proceeds to be used for education); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 461.540 (2012) (setting forth the various areas that lottery proceeds will help 
fund, such as the creation of jobs, furthering the economic development of 
Oregon, and financing public education); W. VA. CODE § 29-22-18 (identifying 
the state interests that are to be supplied with additional funding by the 
lottery proceeds, some of which include the School Building Debt Service Fund 
and the Education, Arts, Sciences, and Tourism Debt Service Fund). See also 
Brown v. Cal. State Lottery Com., 284 Cal. Rptr. 108-13 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that the plaintiff, who was unable to choose his own lottery numbers 
due to a malfunctioning machine, was not a third-party beneficiary of the 
contract between the state lottery commission and the store since the 
California State Lottery Act was passed as a means of providing additional 
funding for education, and not to assist people “who wish to engage in a 
capricious fling with fortune”). 
 399.  E.g., private lotteries. 
 400.  See Harris, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 673 (holding that a raffle sponsored by 
charitable organization was an illegal lottery and, therefore, the court refused 
to compel the sponsor hand over the prize); Keene Convenient Mart, Inc. v. 
SSS Band Backers, 427 S.E.2d 322, 324-25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
when an error caused the randomness of an otherwise legal raffle to be 
compromised, the raffle fell within the ambit of gambling prohibitions and, as 
such, the proceeds were to be turned over the county). 
 401.  See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 
(discussing federal public policy concerns regarding broadcasting). 
 402.  See Broadcasting Lottery Information, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012) 
(prohibiting radio and television advertisements of lotteries); Exceptions 
Relating to Certain Advertisements and Other Information and to state 
conducted lotteries, 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (2012) (exempting state lotteries from 
the broadcasting ban). 
Do Not Delete 2/9/2013  4:27 PM 
84 The John Marshall Law Review [46:37 
states that ban lotteries.403 
In the modern era, although some form of lottery is legal in 
many states, absent legislation specifically authorizing lotteries, 
they remain subject to the same legal objection as any gambling 
bargain.404 Gambling exacerbates the tendency that so many 
people seem to display. Too many people seem to be willing to 
venture their money in the face of a significantly high probability 
that they will lose it. Furthermore, the risk of loss of their money 
is not counterbalanced by the prospect of a sufficiently substantial 
benefit because the prospect of gain is too remote. Gambling has 
been banned historically because it tends to impose unacceptably 
high risks of serious financial injury on certain classes of the 
community.405 
Moreover, the NGISC did not appear to detect irrefutable 
evidence to support the presence of counterbalancing specific 
community benefits derived from lotteries.406 However, “[t]here is 
much anecdotal evidence to support the notion that gambling . . . 
provides economic benefits for the communities that allow it.”407 
This anecdotal evidence, which has apparently not been confirmed 
by formal data evidencing support,408 helps to explain the 
following observation. A vast number of states have enacted laws 
authorizing lotteries that are run by, or on behalf of, state or local 
government in order to raise funds for education or other public 
purposes.409 
However, this modern trend towards more and more 
extensive state creation of lotteries has not changed the societal 
foundation of reprobation towards lotteries. In the more recent 
past, lotteries have been resoundingly prohibited in many states 
 
 403.  See generally Edge Broad. Co.¸ 509 U.S. at 418 (refusing to allow a 
North Carolina radio station from advertising the lottery because of North 
Carolina’s ban on lotteries despite the fact that Virginia radio stations 
broadcasting in North Carolina were able to broadcast such advertisements); 
Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954) (refusing to ban 
the advertisements of give-aways because such programs were not considered 
to be lotteries). 
 404.  See Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412 
(Wyo. 1977) (concluding that while the lottery is legal, gambling debts are still 
unenforceable). 
 405.  See Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 58l (holding that the legislature cannot 
constitutionally permit certain forms of legalized gambling because it 
constituted a lottery in violation of state constitution); Williams, 572 P.2d at 
412 (holding that wagers are against human welfare). 
 406.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (emphasis in the original) (“[I]t 
appears that the public’s approval of lotteries rests more on the idea of 
lotteries reducing the potential tax burden on the general public than it is on 
any specific instance of relief.”). 
 407.  HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 87 (emphasis added). 
 408.  Id. at 88. 
 409.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“[M]ore common is the 
‘earmarking’ of lottery money for identified programs”). 
Do Not Delete 2/9/2013  4:27 PM 
2012] Lotteries and Public Policy 85 
as a form of gambling.410 In light of this norm of reprobation, laws 
that legalize any form of gambling, including lotteries, are treated 
by the courts as exceptions to the general policy against 
gambling.411 Such lottery-enabling laws will therefore continue to 
be very strictly construed.412 The unabated strength of the state 
public policy against gambling predicates that statutes and 
regulations that impact legalized gambling must be construed 
strictly and narrowly.413 The judiciary’s goal is to limit the powers 
and rights claimed under such legislative authority to the 
boundaries set in them by the legislature.414 
In this regard, statutorily authorized gaming entities are the 
intended beneficiaries of statutes requiring the fair and equitable 
dissemination of gambling information to the public.415 Statutes 
legalizing gambling have the purpose of authorizing, licensing, 
and controlling gaming activities in order to stimulate and 
promote the growth of the particular state’s economy.416 The 
statutory intention is ultimately to foster and assure that honest 
wagering occurs.417 This is intended to preserve the public’s 
confidence in perceiving that this is the case.418 The overall 
intention is to strictly regulate all parties involved in gaming 
operations in order to preserve the integrity and credibility of 
these operations.419 
 
 410.  38 AM. JUR. 2D, Gambling §§ 5, 10 (2012). 
 411.  See Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Travelers Express Co., 745 F. Supp. 
1266, 1270 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (referring to laws permitting some forms of 
gambling as exceptions). 
 412.  38 AM. JUR. 2D, Gambling §§ 17, 18 (2012). 
 413.  Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 910 P.2d 281, 287 (N.M. 1995) (“[W]hen 
considering whether the legislature has authorized use of Power Bingo 
devices, we must, in light of New Mexico’s strong public policy against 
gambling, construe the terms of the Act narrowly.”). See also Ramesar v. 
State, 224 A.D.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (citation omitted) (“Public 
policy continues to disfavor gambling; thus, the regulations pertaining thereto 
are to be strictly construed.”). 
 414.  See West Indies, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 214 P.2d 144, 146-47, 
154 (Nev. 1950) (limiting rights granted to licensees to conduct gambling by 
holding that the right to conduct gambling activities does not confer the right 
to bring an action to collect gambling debt). 
 415.  Sports Form, Inc. v. Leroy’s Horse & Sports Place, 823 P.2d 901, 903 
(Nev. 1992). 
 416.  St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n, 648 So. 2d 
1310, 1317 (La. 1995). 
 417.  Moya v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm’n, 870 P.2d 620, 622 (Colo. 
1994). 
 418.  Id. 
 419.  Mastro v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 667 N.E.2d 594, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
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B. Lotteries by Any Other Name Nevertheless Remain Lotteries420 
Judicial determinations as to whether or not activities 
constitute lotteries are issues of substantive law.421 
Categorizations by the operators of the activity are not legally 
dispositive because the issue is one of substance rather than 
terminology. 
1. Bingo as Lotteries 
Courts are split on the issue as to whether or not bingo per se 
constitutes a lottery within the meaning of state antilottery 
constitutional or statutory provisions. Arguably, a majority of the 
decisions have concluded that bingo is a lottery.422 A minority of 
 
 420.  The same may be said of roses. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2 (quoting “What’s in a name? that which we call 
a rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet . . . .”). 
 421.  See generally Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d 
324 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (determining whether New Jersey or Pennsylvania’s 
substantive laws applied to the diversity case in which the plaintiffs claimed 
the defendant resort and casino failed to pay them the $1 million that they 
had allegedly won). 
 422.  See City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435, 436-37 (Ala. 1994) 
(deciding that municipal ordinance that permitted nonprofit organizations to 
use instant bingo to raise money was unconstitutional since instant bingo did 
not constitute “bingo” as intended by the amendment to the Alabama 
Constitution, but instead constituted a type of lottery and was thus banned by 
the constitution); State v. Crayton, 344 So. 2d 771, 774 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) 
(holding that while bingo is a lottery and contrary to the law of the state, an 
illegal activity can be taxed); Pruit v. State, 557 N.E.2d 684, 690-91 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that “bingo played for a prize received by chance or lot in 
exchange for consideration is a lottery and prohibited by [statute]”); Parrish, 
887 P.2d at 136-37 (explaining the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision that the 
legislature exceeded its authority by passing a bill permitting instant bingo 
since instant bingo lacks the same characteristics of regular bingo, and is “far 
more similar to slow machines, punchboards, and other forms of gaming”); 
Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 64 (holding that bingo, keno, and pull-tab games, among 
other games involving no skill, constitute lotteries within the meaning of 
Missouri Constitution, and thus legislation authorizing such types of gambling 
is unconstitutional); Army Navy Bingo, Garrison No. 2196 v. Plowden, 314 
S.E.2d 339, 340 (S.C. 1984) (holding that bingo is a lottery and there is no 
right to conduct bingo under either the state constitution or under the U.S. 
Constitution); Bingo Bank, Inc. v. Strom, 234 S.E.2d 881, 883 (S.C. 1977) 
(holding that a game of “Bingo Bank” was in violation of the constitutional 
provision prohibiting lotteries except the “game of bingo,” since there were 
material differences between “Bingo Bank” and the “game of bingo” in that 
“Bingo Bank” was “played with one player . . . . [t]he cards [were] all identical 
and the winner [did not] depend upon covering the squares in any 
configuration”); Sec’y of State v. St. Augustine Church/St. Augustine Sch., 766 
S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tenn. 1989) (holding unconstitutional certain statutes 
enacted in an attempt to legalize bingo under the auspices of various 
charitable, religious, and fraternal and other non-profit organizations because 
the state constitution’s “terms are sweeping and absolute[, and] [i]t simply 
removes from the General Assembly the authority to authorize lotteries for 
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court decisions has held otherwise in well-reasoned opinions.423 
The present day legal position, in light of the widespread adoption 
of state-run lotteries, arguably draws a discernible distinction 
between a “lottery,” “bingo,” and other games of chance in such a 
way that lotteries stand apart from other games of chance.424 
2. “Bank Nights” as Lotteries 
During a period in American history, a variety of so-called 
“bank night” plans became popular among the operators of movie 
theaters.425 Often these plans conferred upon purchasers of an 
admission ticket the right to participate in drawings for prizes.426 
In some instances, the winner was required to be present at the 
 
any purpose—charitable, public, private, or any other.”). 
 423.  See People v. 8,000 Punchboard Card Devices, 191 Cal. Rptr. 154, 155 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that in 1976, the California electorate passed 
legislation permitting “cities and counties to provide for bingo games, but only 
for charitable purposes,” and that it further expanded the definition of bingo 
three years later); Carroll v. State, 361 So. 2d 144, 147-48 (Fla. 1978) (citation 
omitted) (affirming that “while the legislature cannot legalize any gambling 
device that would in effect amount to a lottery . . . the legislature, in its 
wisdom, has seen fit to permit bingo as a form of recreation, and at the same 
time, has allowed worthy organizations to receive the benefits.”); St. John’s 
Melkite Catholic Church v. Comm’r of Revenue, 242 S.E.2d 108, 113 (Ga. 
1978) (citation omitted) (citing the “[t]he “bingo amendment” to the Georgia 
Constitution which states that “the operation of a nonprofit bingo game . . . 
shall be legal.”); Bingo Catering & Supplies, Inc. v. Duncan, 699 P.2d 512, 513 
(Kan. 1985) (upholding the constitutionality of an amendment that placed 
strict restrictions on bingo operations, which were legalized despite the 
Kansas Constitution’s prohibition on lotteries); Bender v. Arundel Arena, Inc., 
236 A.2d 7, 15 (Md. 1967) (holding that bingo and slot machines were 
historically exempted from the laws making gambling illegal); Frank v. Dore, 
635 So. 2d 1369, 1374 (Miss. 1994) (explaining that “[i]t would be [a mockery 
of the law] . . . to hold that while [one statute] legally permits charitable bingo 
games, . . . [another statute] completely bars any form of court assisted 
recovery for participants in legally conducted bingo games”). See generally 
Knight v. State ex rel. Moore, 574 So. 2d 662 (Miss. 1990) (holding that the 
constitutional provision banning lotteries was not violated by legislation 
permitting certain forms of bingo after it considered the popular meaning of 
the terms “lottery” and “bingo” to determine whether the former includes the 
latter, and determined that it does not). 
 424.  See Knight, 574 So. 2d at 669 (deciding bingo is not a lottery). 
 425.  See Goodwill Adver. Co. v. Elmwood Amusement Corp., 133 A.2d 644, 
647-48 (R.I. 1957) (finding that there was no additional consideration than the 
normal price of the ticket because patrons did not have to pay more than the 
regular ticket price and the drawing was open to nonpatrons as well). 
 426.  See, e.g., People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. Supp. 788, 789-90, 793 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1933) (explaining that although some states found “bank 
nights” to be illegal lotteries where the tickets to win prizes were distributed 
when a product was purchased, in the case at bar, the theatre was distributing 
tickets to both ticket purchasing customers as well as non-paying visitors, and 
the winning number was announced both inside and outside the theatre so the 
tickets were seen as a promotional effort to increase profits). 
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theater, while in others, physical presence was not mandatory.427 
Of course, these schemes were supposedly promotional.428 The 
ostensible business purpose was to increase the volume of business 
at theatres.429 In some cases, such schemes were held not to 
constitute lotteries.430 The legal rationale focused on proof that the 
total consideration that each individual customer of the theater 
exchanged was the routine price of the ticket purchased for normal 
admission.431 There was therefore allegedly no proof of any 
additional consideration over and beyond the usual transaction for 
the industry.432 However, most of the decided cases held that bank 
night schemes were lotteries and therefore illegal.433 
 
 427.  Id. 
 428.  Id. 
 429.  Id. 
 430.  Id. 
 431.  See Cardas, 137 Cal. App. Supp. at 792 (examining similar cases in 
which the tickets were only available to paying customers, and so part of the 
consideration paid was for the prize ticket); St. Peter v. Pioneer Theatre Corp., 
291 N.W. 164, 170 (Iowa 1940) (deciding that “it is entirely possible that the 
act, specified by the promisor as being sufficient in his discretion to constitute 
consideration for and acceptance of his promise, might have no monetary 
value and yet constitute a legal consideration for the promise”); State v. 
Eames, 183 A. 590, 591 (N.H. 1936) (providing that “[w]hile it is abundantly 
clear . . . that it is perfectly legal to make a gift the recipient of which is 
selected by chance, it is equally clear that one may not obtain immunity from 
prosecution under the lottery law by resort to the device of a pretended gift”); 
Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp, 293 N.Y.S. 745, 747 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 
1937) (permitting recovery premised on promissory estoppel because the 
plaintiff had attended the bank night and signed the book, which constituted 
consideration, so defendant could not then refuse to pay on a basis of 
illegality); People v. Shafer, 289 N.Y.S. 649, 654 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1936) (finding 
where the party merely registers without payment of any admission charge, 
the courts are more prone to find that no lottery exists); Goodwill Adver. Co., 
133 A.2d at 647-48 (holding bank night plan was legal because it was open to 
nonpaying participants and theater patrons whose admission price was not 
consideration for a chance at the drawing); State ex rel. Dist. Atty. Gen. v. 
Crescent Amusement Co., 95 S.W.2d 310, 310-12 (Tenn. 1936) (affirming a 
lower court ruling that where a theatre held a “bank night” open to anyone, 
not just paying patrons, it was not a lottery or prohibited game under 
statutory law since there was no consideration). 
 432.  See State ex rel. Dist. Atty. Gen. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 95 
S.W.2d 310, 310-12 (Tenn. 1936) (determining that since the “bank night” was 
open to anyone, not just paying patrons, there was no consideration and it was 
thus not a prohibited lottery). 
 433.  See Affiliated Enters. v. Waller, 5 A.2d 257, 260-62 (Del. 1939) 
(declining to enforce a contract because it required patrons to sign a book and 
be present at the theatre, which constituted consideration, and it thus created 
an illegal contract); State v. Mabrey, 60 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Iowa 1953) (deciding 
that “[i]t did not cease to be a lottery because some were admitted to play 
without paying for the privilege, so long as others paid for their chances”); 
Hardy v. St. Matthew’s Cmty. Ctr., 240 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Ky. 1951) (concluding 
that even if a lottery is illegal pursuant to a statute, if the purchasing party 
pays for her ticket and she is selected in the drawing, the offering party must 
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3. Lotteries for Charity 
The number of states that enacted constitutional provisions 
prohibiting lotteries raised an important question. This question is 
whether or not certain forms of wagering authorized by the 
legislature constitute a lottery proscribed by the particular state 
constitution.434 Irrefutably, the specific language of the 
 
comply with the contract and deliver the winnings); Commonwealth of Ky. v. 
Malco-Memphis Theatres, Inc., 169 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Ky. 1943) (“If the chance 
of winning a prize is part of the inducement to purchase goods or tickets of 
admission, the scheme is a lottery.”); Doskey v. United Theatres, Inc., 11 So. 
2d 276, 278-79 (La. Ct. App. 1942) (finding that the court could not determine 
the merits of a case because the lottery was illegal, and so the plaintiff could 
not recover the winnings from the lottery); Commonwealth of Mass. v. Wall, 3 
N.E.2d 28, 30 (Mass. 1936) (holding “that the price must come from 
participants in the game in part at least as payments for their chances and 
that the indirect advantage to the theatre of larger attendance is not in itself a 
price paid by participants.”); Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial 
Theatrical Enter., 267 N.W. 602, 602-03 (Mich. 1936) (affirming the lower 
court’s injunction against a competing theatre’s lottery because it violated a 
statute that prohibited lotteries since there was indirect consideration paid to 
the theatre through the increased attendance and associated financial gains); 
State ex rel. Hunter v. Omaha Motion Picture Exhibitors Ass’n, 297 N.W. 547, 
549-50 (Neb. 1941) (“A game does not cease to be a lottery because some, or 
even many, of the players are admitted to play free, so long as others continue 
to pay for their chances.”); Furst v. A. & G. Amusement Co., 25 A.2d 892, 893 
(N.J. 1942) (deciding that the contract under which the plaintiff sought to 
recover was invalid and unenforceable because it comprised a statutorily 
illegal lottery because consideration was present since some patrons paid for 
their ticket and received entry, and other patrons experienced a hardship in 
having going to the theatre to enter their names); State v. Jones, 107 P.2d 324, 
326-27 (deciding that a “Bank Night” was a lottery because the three elements 
of a lottery—consideration, chance, and prize—were present, and patrons who 
purchased tickets, as well as non-patrons, were entered into the drawing and 
that was found to be adequate consideration); Miller, 2 N.E.2d at 39-40 
(affirming that in purchasing a ticket at the regular price, the patron was also 
purchasing a chance to win the prize therefore the operation was an illegal 
lottery); Troy Amusement Co., 28 N.E.2d at 214-15 (deciding that even though 
the patrons paid the regular ticket price for admission, the increased 
patronage and revenue comprised sufficient consideration and constituted an 
illegal lottery); McFadden, 91 P.2d at 295 (“If it is a lottery as to those who do 
pay, it necessarily is a lottery as to those who do not pay for their chances.”); 
Commonwealth of Pa. v. Lund, 15 A.2d 839, 845-46, 848 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940) 
(deciding that even though some patrons paid for tickets in the drawing and 
others did not, the operation constituted an illegal lottery); State v. Robb & 
Rowley United, Inc., 118 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (deciding that 
the small variation in the scheme where non-paying patrons were entered into 
the drawing along with the ticket paying patrons still constituted 
consideration in an illegal lottery); Stern v. Miner, 300 N.W. 738, 739-40 (Wis. 
1941) (deciding that although paying and non-paying patrons could enter the 
lottery, it was nonetheless an illegal lottery, and the contract was void and 
unenforceable). 
 434.  See generally Ex parte Pierotti, 184 P. 209 (Nev. 1919) (explaining slot 
machines do not constitute lotteries as defined in the state constitution); Bhd. 
of Friends, 247 P.2d at 796 (providing that the earlier constitution was written 
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constitutional measure controls the judiciary’s interpretation of its 
meaning. The fact that the enacted statutes license or permit 
lotteries for charitable, religious, civic, educational, or fraternal 
purposes is not an automatic “safe harbor” for such statutory 
enactments.435 Despite their beneficent purposes, such statutes 
will be ruled to be unconstitutional under a state constitutional 
provision whenever the statutes have sought to create 
constitutionally forbidden lotteries.436 
V. THE LEGAL IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY OF LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES IN STATE LOTTERY LAWS 
Of course, the argument can be made that public policy with 
respect to lotteries has not been fundamentally changed by recent 
state legislative changes in lottery laws. The precision of the 
legislation certainly circumscribes its legal reach. State 
legislatures have targeted the operation of lotteries within the 
state by restricting their operation to the particular state alone. 
This is of course a function of state sovereignty. The clear cut legal 
effect has been to create a state monopoly in each individual state 
that has taken this course of action. However, the creation of these 
state-lottery monopolies may nevertheless have left state common 
law intact. State substantive common-law public policy principles 
may have survived intact for the following reasons. 
First, the fundamental and unanimous individual state 
motivation for the legalization of lotteries has been the 
substitution of a voluntary tax to take the place of involuntary 
taxation.437 “Voters want states to spend more, and politicians look 
at lotteries as a way to get tax money for free.”438 The efficacy of 
this argument has been reinforced by the intensity of modern 
political pressures created by almost unprecedented economic 
 
broadly to adjust for developments over time, and that slot machines are 
illegal as against the constitutional provision); State v. Tursich, 267 P.2d 641, 
641 (Mont. 1954) (finding a state “purporting to authorize the use of 
punchboards as trade stimulators upon the purchase of a use tax stamp, is 
unconstitutional as an attempt to authorize lotteries” in violation of the state 
constitution). 
 435.  See Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d at 796 (determining that statute granting 
charitable organizations exemption from the constitutional ban on gambling 
was unconstitutional). 
 436.  See, e.g., id. (finding that regardless of the charitable function of an 
organization, if the operation runs contrary to the state constitution, it will be 
deemed illegal). 
 437.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (emphasis added) (“The principal 
argument in every state to promote the adoption of a lottery has focused on its 
value as a source of ‘painless’ revenue: players voluntarily spending their 
money (as opposed to the general public being taxed) for the benefit of the 
public good.”). 
 438.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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stress.439 The crucible of this stress requires politicians to traverse 
a passage between Scylla440 and Charybdis,441 commonly referred 
to as being “between a rock and a hard place.”442 It consists of 
excruciating political pressure on states to either increase 
taxation, in order to maintain public programs at current levels of 
generosity,443 or cut these programs.444 The concomitant public 
pain and suffering may routinely lead to political upheaval. So, 
wherever possible, politicians tend to select the alternative of 
raising taxes using the “free” mechanism, rather than cutting 
public programs.445 
Additionally, another critically important set of factors play a 
role. In its Report on Lotteries,446 the NGISC has indicated that 
lottery promoters have argued that “because illegal gambling 
already exists, a state-run lottery is an effective device both for 
capturing money for public purposes that otherwise would 
disappear into criminal hands and also for suppressing illegal 
gambling.”447 This may be perceived as the engine that propels 
legislative conduct to legalize state-run lotteries, since this 
decision implicates legislative public policy to legalize the lesser of 
two evils. 
Therefore, the lottery structure of the forty or so states that 
have enacted lottery statutes has been designed to put lottery 
operations in place as part of each state’s administrative law 
structure.448 State lotteries are part of the administrative agency 
 
 439.  Id. 
 440.  See HAMILTON: MYTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 222 (stating that “[in 
mythology, this was a perilous sea passage between] the whirlpool of 
implacable Charybdis and the black cavern into which Scylla sucked whole 
ships”). 
 441.  Id. 
 442.  See, e.g., Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, 
http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/between+the+devil+and+the+deep+blue+s
ea (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (explaining that in some places this dilemma is 
referred to as being “between the devil and the deep blue sea”). 
 443.  See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (explaining that once lotteries 
have been introduced, they become a necessary evil to continue state funding 
of public benefits). 
 444.  Id. 
 445.  See id. at 2 (stating that politicians view lotteries as a means of 
attaining tax money for free). 
 446.  Id. 
 447.  See id. at 3 (citations omitted) (explaining that the creation of a state-
run lottery has resulted in the elimination of illegal lotteries throughout the 
state, except for New York City). 
 448.  See Clotfelter et al., supra note 22, at 19 (emphasis added) (“Owing to 
its structure and management orientation, the typical state lottery authority 
has evolved into a new breed of governmental agency[, in which] [v]irtually all 
state lotteries conform to a single basic model . . . .”). 
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structure of each state’s executive branch of government.449 In the 
interest of completeness on this point, it is acknowledged that 
these state administrative agencies do not function under the 
authority of the Government of the United States. They are 
therefore not subject to the Federal Administrative Procedure 
Act.450 However, state lottery authorities—being administrative 
agencies of the state that created them—are undeniably subject to 
applicable provisions of the United States Constitution.451 
In any event, the widespread state embrace of lotteries raises 
fundamental questions relating to substantive common-law public 
policy. The most important question may be whether or not a 
state’s embrace of the lesser of two evils thereby transforms that 
evil in any substantive way. Does this lesser evil now cease to be 
an evil? Additional questions would be whether or not “lotteries 
[are] a more or less harmless form of recreation[?]”452 And whether 
or not “lottery play is a benign activity[?]”453 And, does the 
legislative legalization of lotteries now justify “taxing lottery 
products [no] more heavily than liquor or tobacco. . . .”454 The 
judiciary’s answer to these questions seems to be a resounding 
“no.”455 
The judiciary’s conclusion seems to be that the lesser of two 
evils nevertheless remains an evil. Its status of being lesser than 
some greater evil does not per se transform its fundamentally evil 
genetic code. Therefore the widespread state creation of lottery-
operation monopolies that now exist throughout the United States 
coexist “cheek by jowl” with the prior fundamental judicially-
enunciated public policy. That prior public policy disfavoring 
gambling in general and lotteries in particular456 remains intact.457 
It is an American legal phenomenon.458 
 
 449.  Lotteries-Lottery Administration, LIBRARY INDEX, 
http://www.libraryindex.com/pages/1604/Lotteries-LOTTERY-
ADMINISTRATION.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
 450.  See 5 U.S.C. §551 (2012) (defining an agency subject to the act as an 
authority of the United States government). 
 451.  E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that state action must conform 
to the constitution). 
 452.  Clotfelter et al., supra note 22, at 21. 
 453.  Id. at 22. 
 454.  Id. 
 455.  Stanley, 2003 WL 22026611, at *19. See also Meyer, 626 N.W.2d. at 267 
(citations omitted) (explaining that when courts are reviewing contracts, they 
will turn to the state’s constitution and laws to determine whether the 
contract is “inconsistent with fair and honorable dealing, contrary to sound 
policy, [or] offensive to good morals[,]” and if it is, the court will not enforce the 
contract on the grounds that it is contrary to the public good). 
 456.  Meyer, 626 N.W.2d. at 267. 
 457.  Id. 
 458.  See, e.g., Clotfelter et al., supra note 22, at 19 (emphasis added) (“The 
lottery is in a sense the state governments’ biggest business venture, and a 
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VI. THE CURRENT AND FUTURE PUBLIC POLICY LANDSCAPE 
Condemnation of gambling generally, and of lotteries in 
particular, has arguably remained the dominant fundamental of 
public policy well into the modern era.459 In this regard, the 
opinion of one commentator seems to be that perhaps the 
NGISC460 “dropped the ball.”461 The commentator expressed a 
number of laments.462 Nevertheless, the commentator 
acknowledged that “the Commission asserted that individual 
states best knew how to regulate themselves. . . .”463 This is 
inevitable because under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution,464 the regulation of gambling remains vested in the 
several states.465 There is, of course, the factor of the regulation of 
Indian gaming.466 However, Congress has certainly acknowledged 
the constitutional legal power of the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.467 Congress has acknowledged this palpable legal 
reality in enacting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 
(“IGRA”),468 “which recognizes tribal sovereignty while giving 
states a significant role in setting the parameters of gaming 
within their borders.”469 It is unlikely therefore that Indian Tribes 
would seek to create and implement lotteries routinely, in 
competition with state lotteries, without a prior compact with each 
 
rather problematic one given widespread ethical and pragmatic concerns about 
gambling.”). 
 459.  See Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 267 (recognizing that the state legislature 
still has a significant anti-gambling stance concerning lotteries). See also 
NIBERT, supra note 229, at 114 (“[T]raditional religious condemnation of 
gambling and lotteries ostensibly was supported by a conservative, 
Republican-controlled Congress, which, in 1996, created the National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission . . . to examine the social implications of 
gambling.”). 
 460.  NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14. 
 461.  See NIBERT, supra note 229, at 115 (“The Commission submitted a 
number of recommendations to the President and Congress for consideration 
but . . . economic exigencies largely eclipsed moral appeals for fairness and 
justice.”). 
 462.  See id. (discussing the commission’s failure to discuss the recent 
economic and political events that led to “the emergence of lotteries and other 
forms of gambling as forms of revenue creation and economic development”). 
 463.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 464.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 465.  See id. (inferring that since there is no enumerated power over 
gambling, that power is vested in the states). 
 466.  See Rand, supra note 61, at 971 (citation omitted) (explaining that 
since Native American tribes are considered sovereign nations, they 
“ordinarily are not subject to the strictures of state law”). 
 467.  See supra note 278 and accompanying discussion. 
 468.  Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §2701 (2006). 
 469.  Rand, supra note 61, at 971 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) 
(“Under IGRA, tribes may conduct gaming only in those states that ‘permit[] 
such gaming for any purpose by any person’ . . . [so] . . . state law in the first 
place dictates the permissible scope of Indian gaming.”). 
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state in which such Indian lotteries would be created and would 
operate. 
The viewpoint of the commission unavoidably suggests that 
the tension in the state law of each of the individual states that 
have legalized lotteries will remain unchanged.470 This tension 
consists of the antipathy between the inexorable advancement of 
lottery legalization by state legislatures on the one hand, and the 
well-established essentially universal public policy that continues 
to reprobate gambling generally and lotteries in particular on the 
other hand.471 So the well-established principle of law that lottery 
contracts are, as a general rule, illegal agreements remains intact. 
Such agreements remain legally null and void. 
Currently, and for the perceivable future, arguably no court 
will allow itself to be made an instrument of enforcing obligations 
arising out of an agreement or transaction that is illegal. Courts 
will continue to leave parties who are equally contaminated where 
they find them.472 A number of states still have constitutional or 
statutory provisions prohibiting the promotion or conduct of 
lotteries or the sale of lottery tickets.473 These prohibitions are 
then subjected to enacted exceptions empowering state monopolies 
to conduct these operations.474 The exceptions have authorized or 
sponsored lotteries for specific purposes at one time or another in 
the state’s history, such as those lotteries that provide sources of 
revenue for charitable, educational, or religious purposes.475 The 
widespread legalization of lotteries throughout the United States 
and in other countries such as Canada, has created other tensions 
between those states where lotteries are lawful and those states 
where lotteries remain prohibited.476 
In recent years, a common practice has developed, especially 
on those occasions when large prizes are offered by various state 
lotteries. The practice is for friends, relatives, and coworkers to 
pool their resources and purchase several tickets with the 
understanding that any winnings will be distributed equally 
 
 470.  See NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14, at 3-1 (suggesting that state 
law will not adhere to other policies). 
 471.  See, e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 11 
(comparing state lotteries to Jekyll-and-Hyde due to the conflict between the 
traditional opinion concerning gambling in which it is seen as a vice and the 
view that gambling is simply an amusement). 
 472.  17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 310 (2012). 
 473.  38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 44 (2012). 
 474.  Id. 
 475.  Id. 
 476.  See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 433-35 (determining that a federal anti-
lottery statute did not violate the First Amendment although it barred a 
business licensed in a state where lotteries were legal from advertising on the 
radio when the lottery advertisements were also heard by residents of another 
state, a state in which the lottery was illegal). 
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among them.477 These agreements to jointly participate in lotteries 
and share in the proceeds, if any, are in many instances informal 
and oral.478 They are of course vulnerable to legal challenges 
leveled at their formation. For example, are these “informal 
arrangements” legally void of mutual assent or consideration? To 
put it bluntly, are these agreements legally unenforceable? Or, are 
they also snared by the provisions of the statute of frauds?479 If 
they are, would these agreements also be subject to the 
ameliorating impact of equitable estoppel and promissory 
estoppel? 
The courts that have confronted these issues have reached 
differing conclusions. Some courts have refused enforcement of 
these agreements on the ground that such agreements violate the 
public policy of the state where the parties to the joint venture 
reside.480 The fact that the activity of actually playing the lottery 
in issue is lawful in the state where the purchase was made has 
not always saved the agreement from legal nullification.481 
Other courts have permitted enforcement of such agreements 
between the parties, reasoning that the parties are not engaged in 
gambling between or amongst themselves.482 Instead, such courts 
have been persuaded that the parties are merely agreeing to 
participate jointly in a specific enterprise.483 Since such an 
enterprise is lawful in the state where the lottery tickets are sold, 
the courts in some states have concluded that no public policy of 
the state in which the participants to the joint venture reside is 
being violated.484 
 
 477.  See Maffea v. Ippolito, 247 A.D.2d 366, 366-67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 
(concerning an agreement between relatives to split lottery winnings). 
 478.  See id. at 366 (describing the agreement as an oral agreement that 
occurred at an informal family party). 
 479.  See generally Matthew J. Gries, Note, Judicial Enforcement of 
Agreements to Share Winning Lottery Tickets, 44 DUKE L.J. 1000 (1995) 
(discussing briefly the possibility of the statute of frauds being applied to 
matters concerning lottery pools). 
 480.  See Hughes, 465 S.E.2d at 826-27 (determining that the agreement 
violated the policy of North Carolina, where the parties resided). 
 481.  See id. at 827-29 (holding a joint venture agreement entered into by a 
North Carolina resident void as violative of a North Carolina antigaming 
statute since the consideration for the agreement was money won at gambling, 
the legal lottery in Virginia). 
 482.  Fitchie v. Yurko, 570 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
 483.  Id. 
 484.  See Talley v. Mathis, 453 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (Ga. 1995) (concluding 
that it was not contrary to Georgia’s public policy for the parties to agree to 
travel to Kentucky in order to purchase lottery tickets with pooled money and 
then share any winnings, and that such an agreement is enforceable in 
Georgia); Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1987) (holding that a 
contract was lawful when it called for one individual to travel to Illinois with 
his friend’s money to purchase lottery tickets and then bring them back to his 
friend in Indiana, where lotteries were illegal because no Indiana law 
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Of course, provisions authorizing and regulating lotteries 
remain strictly construed in states that have authorized the 
creation of lotteries. Additionally, such provisions are subject to 
interpretation in conjunction with other anti-gambling statutes. 
As a result, assertions of illegality may nevertheless be leveled at 
agreements arising from participation in authorized lotteries. 
Moreover, although a lottery may be authorized in one 
jurisdiction, the legal validity in one state cannot legally transfer 
to the sale of lottery tickets in a jurisdiction that forbids such 
sales.485 This would violate state sovereignty outright. 
Nevertheless, some courts have expressed concern that the 
refusal to enforce contracts to share in the returns from a winning, 
state-promoted lottery ticket on public policy grounds is 
problematic.486 This refusal of court enforcement makes such 
agreements perilous. It can be perceived as permitting 
unscrupulous holders of winning tickets to renege on their 
agreements. Permitting such unscrupulous actors to escape 
enforcement of these agreements into which all parties freely 
entered merits rational inquiry and reflection.487 The question 
arises as to whether or not this failure to enforce these agreements 
confers any measureable benefit on the non-enforcing state.488 
Arguably, an agreement to divide the proceeds from a 
 
prohibited such conduct); Miller v. Radikopf, 228 N.W.2d 386, 387-91 (Mich. 
1975) (enforcing agreement between the parties to split the proceeds of any 
winnings gained from the two free tickets they received from the Irish 
Sweepstakes for every 20 tickets they sold in Michigan despite the fact that 
selling sweepstakes in Michigan was illegal since it would be contrary to 
public policy not to enforce the agreement because it was not illegal under 
Irish law to pay the proceeds to the holders of tickets or illegal under Michigan 
law to be paid the proceeds voluntarily); Pineiro v. Nieves, 259 A.2d 920, 921 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (permitting, by statute, New Jersey residents 
to possess lottery tickets lawfully bought in lottery states, and noting that 
public policy was not offended by agreements to share the proceeds of a lottery 
ticket); Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 426-32 (Tex. 1967) (holding that 
Texas public policy was not violated by an agreement between two individuals 
in which one of them would travel to Mexico to buy Mexican lottery tickets and 
that they would split any winnings since it was a Mexican contract and the 
winnings were to be collected in Mexico). 
 485.  38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 60 (2012). 
 486.  See Pearsall v. Alexander, 572 A.2d 113, 117 (D.C. 1990) (stating that 
since the lottery is legal, the failure to enforce agreements to split proceeds 
would only benefit individuals who are unjustly benefiting by trying to keep 
another’s winnings for themselves); Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 
1987) (believing that it would be bizarre to prevent Indiana residents from 
entering into an agreement to split the proceeds from an Illinois lottery when 
the lottery was legal in Illinois and the purchase occurred there). 
 487.  See Pearsall, 572 A.2d at 117 (determining that agreements to split 
lottery proceeds should be enforced because failure to enforce them would 
result in unscrupulous individuals being allowed to keep someone else’s share 
of the winnings). 
 488.  Id. at 117. 
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successful, legal lottery ticket creates an enforceable oral contract 
as a number of courts have found.489 Valid legal support is derived 
from the evidence of all the facts and surrounding circumstances 
presented to the courts. Characterization of the conduct of the 
parties as a joint venture or informal partnership agreement to 
participate in and divide the profits from lottery ticket purchases 
is not necessarily legally irrational.490 
 
 489.  See id. (finding that the parties had entered into an oral argument to 
share the proceeds from the winning lottery ticket); Johnson v. Spence, 286 
A.D.2d 481, 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (finding an oral agreement between a 
girlfriend and her boyfriend to share any lottery prizes). 
 490.  See Pearsall, 572 A.2d at 117 (holding that the record supported the 
existence of an oral agreement between two friends to share equally in the 
proceeds from a winning District of Columbia lottery ticket based on their 
conduct on the evening that the ticket was purchased); Fitchie v. Yurko, 570 
N.E.2d 892, 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that there was sufficient evidence 
of an informal partnership agreement between the claimants and the ticket 
holder to entitle them to an equal share in the winnings); Pando v. Fernandez, 
118 A.D.2d 474, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that summary judgment 
for the recipient of the proceeds from a winning state-operated lottery ticket 
on the ground of the impossibility of the proof of a condition precedent, saintly 
intervention, was inappropriate where one version of the terms of an oral 
partnership agreement advanced by the minor could be proven in a court of 
law); Yates v. Tisdale, 3 Edw. Ch. 71, 76 (1838) (holding that there was 
sufficient evidence presented of a clear, positive, and unconditional agreement 
to sell a share of the lottery ticket, and that the purchaser was entitled to the 
same share of the prize); Hamilton v. Long, 588 N.E.2d 942, 943 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that there was sufficient, competent, and credible 
evidence to support the finding of an enforceable oral contract between the 
recipient of the value of an automobile won during her appearance on a “Cash 
Explosion” television show and two employees who had purchased the “entry” 
lottery ticket which entitled the holder to appear on the show); King v. 
Thomas, No. CA 90-9, 1990 WL 127935, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1990) 
(holding that lower court’s conclusion that the parties had agreed to jointly 
purchase and share equally in the proceeds from both Super Lotto and kicker 
lottery tickets was a well-reasoned decision based upon probative and credible 
evidence); Johnson, 286 A.D.2d at 482 (holding that live-in girlfriend stated 
cause of action for breach of oral agreement by alleging that she and her 
partner had agreed to purchase lottery tickets jointly and to share proceeds of 
any winning lottery ticket); Johnson v. Johnson, 191 A.D.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1993) (holding an agreement that was signed and witnessed 
demonstrated the parties’ intent to split any possible winnings from a lottery 
ticket, and that the said agreement was further supported by consideration in 
that the parties agreed to “surrender their respective rights to claim the entire 
prize . . . and . . . to share equally the related tax liabilities”); Stepp v. 
Freeman, 694 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an informal 
group in which coworkers pooled their resources to purchase lottery tickets 
when the jackpot reached $8 million had entered into an implied contract from 
which a member would not be dropped unless he expressed an intent to leave 
group to the organizer or the organizer dropped him from the group for failure 
to pay, and which was breached when the organizer unilaterally dropped the 
coworker from group after they had an unrelated personal dispute); Domingo 
v. Mitchell, 257 S.W.3d 34, 41 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding that coworker’s 
agreement to advance another coworker’s share of a group payment for lottery 
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Certainly, where sufficient evidence necessary to prove the 
existence of an enforceable oral contract to divide lottery winnings 
is presented, a court may validly affirm a motion for summary 
judgment by the parties alleging its existence.491 Some courts have 
presumed the existence of an agreement to distribute the proceeds 
from a winning, legal lottery ticket between parties who pool 
resources to purchase lottery tickets.492 This is not an 
insurmountable task for courts by any stretch of the legal 
imagination. The same proportion of the parties’ contribution to 
the purchase price of all tickets, the “pooling” agreement, if you 
like, can be the resolution mechanism.493 It can simply require 
proof that the percentage of the purchase price was contributed in 






tickets, and the coworker’s agreement to reimburse her, was an exchange of 
promises that was sufficient for consideration to create a binding contract). 
 491.  See Maffea, 247 A.D.2d at 367 (holding that alleged oral agreement 
made at informal family gathering to share grand prize in state lottery if 
either party won was unenforceable due to the lack of evidence that party who 
eventually won the lottery had assented to agreement at the time of the 
gathering or any time following it); Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 270 (holding that 
since the parties had simply promised to share any possible winnings, without 
actually pooling their money to purchase the tickets, the defendants had not 
converted the plaintiffs’ property when the plaintiffs did not contribute to the 
funds used to purchase the tickets). 
 492.  See Cahn v. Kensler, 34 F. 472, 472-73 (C.C. W.D. Mo. 1888) 
(discussing that the court’s belief that the parties had split the cost of the 
lottery tickets was what led it to determine that the two parties had jointly 
owned the winning lottery ticket); Lomberk v. Lenox, 19 Phila. Co. Rptr. 562, 
570 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1989) (inferring that there was an agreement to split the 
proceeds from a winning lottery ticket because of the parties’ conduct). 
 493.  See Lomberk, 19 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 573 (holding that when people pool 
their money in order to buy lottery tickets, the winnings must be split so that 
each party receives the same proportion of the winnings as their contribution 
to the pool, except when there is an express contract that the winnings are to 
be retained by the purchaser). 
 494.  See Cahn, 34 F. at 473 (discussing that if the parties had jointly 
purchased the two lottery tickets with funds equally contributed by both 
parties, such a purchase was determinative of the claimant’s recovery of a one-
half share of the winnings, thus presuming that an agreement to equally 
divide the winnings was formed under such circumstances); Lomberk, 19 
Phila. Co. Rptr. at 573 (holding that when people pool their money in order to 
buy lottery tickets, the winnings must be split so that each party receives the 
same proportion of the winnings as their contribution to the pool, except when 
there is an express contract that the winnings are to be retained by the 
purchaser). 
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A. Two Contrasting Cases 
In Cole v. Hughes,495 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
declined to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the ticket itself.496 
This made sense because common-law courts will not reach 
decisions that the court itself is legally incapable of enforcing.497 
The Cole court ruled that it was legally precluded by the facts from 
enforcing any in rem adjudication over legal or equitable title to 
the lottery ticket.498 This was the case because the ticket was 
located outside the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts.499 
The ticket was in fact located in Virginia.500 Unavoidably, 
therefore, a decision by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
declaring ownership of the ticket would be nullified if the Virginia 
courts disagreed with the North Carolina court’s decision.501 
The counterclaim by the defendants sought adjudication of 
“the rights of the parties under the alleged joint venture 
agreement.”502 The Cole court clearly had jurisdiction over this 
issue for the following reasons. First, at the time of the litigation 
“all parties to the agreement [were] North Carolina residents, and 
they entered into the venture in North Carolina.”503 The Court 
therefore applied North Carolina public policy to the joint venture 
in issue and declared “their joint venture to be illegal.”504 
This determination invoked North Carolina’s antigambling 
and antilottery public policy. The Court made it clear in no 
uncertain terms that “North Carolina public policy is against 
gambling and lotteries.”505 Inevitably therefore, the Court of 
Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of 
the defendants’ counterclaim “because it sought to enforce a 
contract or joint venture which is illegal and against the public 
policy of North Carolina.”506 
In Talley v. Mathis,507 the Supreme Court of Georgia reached 
an antithetical conclusion508 based upon the facts of that 
 
 495.  Cole, 442 S.E.2d at 86. 
 496.  See id. at 89 (“It is indisputable that [the lottery ticket in issue] had 
been presented to the lottery authorities in Virginia, and that it is there 
now.”). 
 497.  See id. (“We do not have the jurisdiction to assert, or the power to 
enforce . . . a decision [of the North Carolina courts] in Virginia.”). 
 498.  Id. 
 499.  See id. at 88 (citations omitted) (“In rem jurisdiction may not be 
invoked over property located outside this state.”). 
 500.  Id. at 89. 
 501.  Id. at 88. 
 502.  Id. at 89. 
 503.  Id. 
 504.  Id. 
 505.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 506.  Id. 
 507.  Talley, 453 S.E.2d at 704. 
 508.  Id. at 706. 
Do Not Delete 2/9/2013  4:27 PM 
100 The John Marshall Law Review [46:37 
controversy.509 In essence, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
concluded that the contract to purchase the winning ticket was 
made in Kentucky.510 It was a contract between the actual 
purchaser on the one hand, and the State of Kentucky on the 
other.511 Furthermore, the contract was perfectly legal in 
Kentucky.512 Moreover, such contracts were perfectly legal for 
persons to enter into in the State of Kentucky.513 The facts of the 
case established that two Georgia residents agreed that the 
defendant’s daughter, who lived in Kentucky, would buy lottery 
tickets for them with money supplied by the Georgia residents.514 
When a ticket the defendant’s daughter purchased won a six 
million dollar prize in the Kentucky lottery, the defendant told the 
plaintiff that the ticket belonged to his daughter and others, and 
not to the plaintiff.515 The plaintiff filed suit against the other 
Georgia resident, the Georgia resident’s daughter, and others.516 
Both the trial court and the court of appeals held that the 
agreement between the parties violated Georgia’s public policy and 
refused to enforce it.517 However, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
reversed the court of appeals.518 
First, the Supreme Court of Georgia quoted the Georgia 
antigambling statute which made gambling agreements void.519 
The Supreme Court of Georgia however noted that the parties’ 
bargain did not involve a situation where one of the parties had to 
lose something, which is a hallmark of a gambling agreement.520 
The Supreme Court of Georgia emphasized that the only gambling 
contract that might exist in the instant case was that between the 
State of Kentucky and the holder of the winning ticket.521 Since 
the State of Kentucky was not a party to the suit, and since that 
state had, in any event, agreed to pay the holder of the winning 
ticket, therefore the agreement was enforceable in Kentucky.522 
 
 509.  Id. 
 510.  See id. (determining that the appellant was simply paying an agent to 
purchase a lottery ticket in Kentucky where it constituted a lawful act). 
 511.  Id. at 705. 
 512.  Id. 
 513.  Id. 
 514.  Id. at 705-06; Talley v. Mathis, 441 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1994). 
 515.  Talley, 441 S.E.2d at 855. 
 516.  Id. 
 517.  See id. at 855 (rebuffing the plaintiff’s argument that a 1992 
amendment to the Georgia Constitution authorizing the lottery indicated a 
change in the state’s public policy, thereby refusing to discuss the 
amendment’s impact). 
 518.  Talley, 453 S.E.2d at 706. 
 519.  Id. at 705. 
 520.  Id. 
 521.  Id. 
 522.  Id. 
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The lower courts had therefore erred in relying on the Georgia 
antigambling statute to nullify the parties’ agreement.523 
Secondly, the Supreme Court of Georgia acknowledged that 
the agreement remained legally vulnerable.524 In this respect, the 
agreement could nevertheless be nullified if it were immoral, 
illegal, or otherwise in violation of the public policy of Georgia.525 
This was the case in light of a Georgia state statute that had 
codified this fundamental common-law principle. However, the 
lottery was lawful in Kentucky.526 Moreover, there were no 
assertions before the court that the parties had agreed illegally to 
purchase a Kentucky lottery ticket in Georgia.527 Nor were any 
assertions made to the court that there was any conduct or any 
facts that violated Georgia law or public policy.528 
On the contrary, the proof presented to the court established 
that the ticket had been purchased lawfully in Kentucky.529 
Indeed, the Georgia residents had merely used the Kentucky 
resident as an agent to do an act that was entirely lawful under 
the laws of Kentucky.530 The Supreme Court of Georgia made it 
quite clear that there was nothing illegal where a Georgia resident 
personally travelled to Kentucky and bought a lottery ticket in 
Kentucky while being there.531 Such conduct did not implicate 
illegal activity of any kind. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
therefore concluded that there was nothing illegal or legally 
improper on the facts of the case.532 The Georgia residents had 
simply contributed money to the joint purchase of a lottery ticket 
to be purchased by a third party who lived in Kentucky.533 
The Supreme Court of Georgia cited a relatively similar 
Indiana case in which the Indiana courts had upheld the legality 
of a significantly similar agreement.534 In the Indiana case cited by 
the Supreme Court of Georgia, two Indiana residents agreed that 
one of them would, on behalf of the other, travel to Illinois and 
purchase lottery tickets in Illinois for the first party.535 The 
purchase of lottery tickets in Illinois was perfectly legal for 
persons in Illinois to do.536 The Indiana courts therefore ruled that 
 
 523.  Id. 
 524.  Id. 
 525.  Id. 
 526.  Id. 
 527.  Id. at 705-06. 
 528.  Id. 
 529.  Id. at 706. 
 530.  Id. 
 531.  Id. 
 532.  Id. 
 533.  Id. 
 534.  Id. 
 535.  Kaszuba, 506 N.E.2d at 1. 
 536.  Id. at 2. 
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the agreement was not unlawful.537 
The Supreme Court of Georgia pointed out that a refusal to 
enforce the agreement would not benefit the citizens of Georgia.538 
In fact, such a refusal by the Supreme Court of Georgia would in 
fact reward duplicitous conduct on the part of the alleged bargain 
breaker. Such conduct would itself violate Georgia’s public 
policy.539 The court thus reversed the decision of the lower court.540 
This reversal permitted the plaintiff to pursue enforcement of the 
alleged contract in Kentucky.541 This approach may very well be 
the emerging view with respect to cases arising under similar 
circumstances. 
There similarly seems to be disagreement over the validity of 
any agreement to share the proceeds of a lottery ticket or pari-
mutuel bet. This is the case in spite of the fact that the wager may 
be perfectly legal in the state where it was made. There is a 
divergence of authority as to whether such agreements are 
enforceable,542 or not.543 Individual state sovereignty will 
perpetuate these antithetical decisions by the courts in the 
individual states. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
“[It] is a common failing of mankind, never to anticipate a 
storm when the sea is calm.”544 The current financial prosperity 
and widespread embrace of lotteries could conceivably mask 
invisible subconscious psychological undercurrents that could 
prove to be ominous for the future.545 Every state would do well to 
remember the pendulum nature of lotteries in light of their history 
in American law.546 States must always be wary and remember 
that it is “when times [are] quiet that they could change.”547 In 
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light of the history of lotteries in American law, the changeable 
nature of public policy is inevitable.548 It is also significantly 
perpetual.549 The quintessence of legal norms applicable to human 
concepts of appropriate national and individual state behavior and 
philosophy will continue to evolve. After all, evolution inevitably 
implicates change in varying degrees.550 
It seems, therefore, that at present, no clear and present 
danger to the widespread conduct of lotteries by the vast majority 
of States in America lurks on the horizon. At least, no such danger 
has reached the stage of galvanizing immediate, or not too distant 
future, action by any American state to curtail lotteries. Moreover, 
the NGISC551 in its report552 seemed to strike a note of some 
comfort in concluding that, with two exceptions,553 “[t]he 
Commission recommends to state governments and the federal 
government that states are best equipped to regulate gambling 
within their own borders. . . .”554 Therefore, should such danger 
arise, American states are seemingly equipped and presumably 
capable of meeting it.555 
In this regard, any present or future obligations placed upon 
the courts to address legal issues pertaining to lotteries will be 
met by current fundamental common-law principles applicable to 
illegal contracts as a genre. These fundamental common-law 
principles applicable to such contracts are transcendent. They are 
as follows. The public policy of any given state will continue to be 
discerned by the judiciary. This discernment will be accomplished 
by the judiciary’s examination of the particular state’s constitution 
and its statutory enactments. These are the two basic sources of a 
state’s public policy. 
It is therefore safe to assert that the judiciary will continue to 
confidently execute its constitutionally assigned task to identify, 
interpret and apply the fundamental common-law concept of 
public policy. As a result, the courts will not affirmatively assist 
parties to an illegal lottery contract where both are equally at 
fault.556 The common law will therefore neither assist in the 
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enforcement of such agreements while they are executory,557 nor 
will the courts intervene to grant any equitable remedies558 where 
such contracts have been fully performed.559 Inevitably therefore, 
plaintiff prizewinners of lottery money prizes cannot blithely 
anticipate routine enforcement of agreements by parties who may 
have agreed to pay such monies over to plaintiffs.560 Plaintiffs who 
sue for enforcement of such agreements will have their suits 
routinely dismissed by the courts.561 In the same vein, a principal 
cannot successfully recover from his agent sums of money paid to 
the agent for sales of lottery tickets.562 
In light of the societal value to be derived from the 
ameliorative power of public policy in the hands of the judiciary, a 
confident assertion may be inescapably valid. Public policy is 
exigent to the judicial function in common-law jurisdictions. 
Moreover, the judiciary’s prowess in exercising this delicate but 
overwhelmingly potent legal power has been magnificently adroit 
and unimpeachable. It continues to be so in the present and the 
future augurs well in this regard too. The judiciary should 
therefore stay firmly astride the unruly horse of public policy.563 
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